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PERSONAL FACTS ABOUT EXECUTIVE OFFICERS:
A PROPOSAL FOR TAILORED DISCLOSURES
TO ENCOURAGE REASONABLE
INVESTOR BEHAVIOR
Joan MacLeod Heminway*

When federal prosecutors asked for-and received-the
indictment of Martha Stewart for criminal securities fraud in June
2003, they based their case on Stewart's alleged misstatements of
material fact and omissions to state material fact regarding a
Specifically, Stewart was
personal stock trading transaction.
alleged to have defrauded the stockholders of Martha Stewart
Living Omnimedia, Inc., of which she then was the Chief Executive
Officer, based on asserted inadequate and nonexistent disclosures
about the facts surrounding her personal sale of securities of
another, unrelated corporation, ImClone Systems Incorporated.1
* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B.
1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University School of Law. I am
indebted to David Hoffman, Lyman Johnson, Donald Langevoort, and Alan
Palmiter for their thoughtful questions and comments on the oral presentation
of the thesis of this Article and to Jayne Barnard, Warren Neel, and others for
flagging relevant examples and resource material. I also wish to thank
participants in research forums at The University of Tennessee College of Law
and The University of Tennessee Corporate Governance Center for their
thoughtful comments on the thesis of this Article and the College of Law for
supporting this project with summer research funding.
1. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 268, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
("Count Nine of the Indictment charges that defendant Stewart made
materially false statements of fact regarding her sale of ImClone securities with
the intention of defrauding and deceiving investors by slowing or stopping the
erosion of the value of the securities issued by her own company, Martha
56-66, Stewart,
Stewart Living Omnimedia. ..."); Superseding Indictment
305 F. Supp. 2d 268 (No. 03 Cr. 717), available at http://news.findlaw.coml
The
hdocs/docs/mstewartlusmspbl0504sind.pdf [hereinafter Indictment].
Indictment also suggests that the statements made by Stewart were misleading
in that they omitted certain material facts necessary to make those statements
not misleading. Indictment, supra, 1$ 60, 61, 63, 64. Stewart also faced civil
claims for insider trading based on other facts surrounding the same stock sale.
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? ObservationsAbout Equal
Justice In U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 248-49
n.2 (2003).

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Stewart was not required to publicly disclose the facts
surrounding her ImClone stock disposition; her public statements
were voluntary. However, this scenario raises the question of
whether Stewart should have been required to publicly disclose the
facts relating to her trading transaction in light of public disclosures
that she was the target of a federal insider trading inquiry. More
broadly, the Stewart securities fraud charge, and other more
common circumstances involving executives' personal lives, raise
questions as to whether (and if so, to what extent) public company2
executive officers 3 should be required, through federal securities
regulation, to publicly disclose (or facilitate corporate public
disclosure of) personal facts, including events and conduct. These
common
personal
circumstances
may
include
criminal
investigations,4 terminal or other serious illness and related medical
treatments,5 financial troubles (e.g., relating to an individual
bankruptcy or divorce settlement),6 and extramarital affairs
(especially those with subordinates). 7 However, less common
2. For purposes of this Article, a "public company" is an issuer of
securities that is required to register one or more classes of securities in
accordance with Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000). In general, references to "corporation" in this Article are
intended to reference public companies.
3. In this Article, the terms "executive officer" and "executive" are used to
reference a member of corporate management defined as an "executive officer"
in Rule 3b-7 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2007).
4. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives21 J. CORP. L. 307,

321-28 (1996) (reviewing

CONNIE BRUCK, MASTER OF THE GAME: STEVE Ross AND
THE CREATION OF TIME WARNER (1994)) (setting out issues raised by failures to

accurately and completely disclose Steve Ross's heart attack and prostate
cancer while he was at the helm of Time Warner Inc.)); Andrew K. Glenn, Note,
Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities Law and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: Hobson's Choice or Business Necessity?,
16 CARDozo L. REv. 537 (1994) (analyzing disclosure questions relating to
executive and key employee illnesses); Brett D. Fromson, Coca-Cola's CEO
Hospitalized With Lung Cancer, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1997, at C3; Benjamin
Pimentel, Public Disclosure: Health of CEOs Brings up Issues of Personal
Privacy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 2004, at C1.
6. See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (assessing the
materiality of, among other things, personal financial transactions and
difficulties); Katherine Yung, Dean Foods Keeps Move in the Open: Company
Says its CEO Will Sell Stock to Help in Divorce Settlement, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003, at 2D.
7. See Carol Hymowitz, PersonalBoundaries Shrink as Companies Punish
Bad Behavior, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2007, at B1 (mentioning, among other
embarrassing private activities of executives, multiple affairs involving David
Colby, the one-time Chief Financial Officer of Wellpoint Inc., for which
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circumstances also raise the same or similar issues. For example, it
recently was reported that John Mackey, the Chief Executive Officer
of Whole Foods Market Inc., posted messages to weblogs unaffiliated
with Whole Foods, under an assumed name, commenting on Whole
Foods's business, competitors, and industry.8 This Article attacks
the broad question of the desired nature and extent of an executive's
duty to disclose personal facts by: isolating existing disclosure duties
relevant to personal facts under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the "1933 Act"),9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended (the "1934 Act"); identifying deficiencies in the existing
disclosure regime relating to executives' personal facts; and
fashioning a targeted proposal for minimal additional disclosures
designed to resolve the identified deficiencies.
The Article begins in Part I with a summary of significant
existing requirements for disclosure about executive officers under
the 1933 Act and 1934 Act. These disclosure requirements are
found in both mandatory disclosure (line-item and gap-filling) and
antifraud rules. Some disclosures are made to the public by the
executives themselves; some are made to the public by the
corporation using information supplied to the corporation by
executives. Through these existing disclosure obligations, executive
officers of public companies are required to divulge personal
information to the public.
Part II of the Article argues that the existing federal securities
law regime applicable to public company executive disclosures of
personal facts is deficient in three respects. Specifically, existing
disclosure requirements place too much discretion in the hands of
executives, cause pressure on important individual rights, and tend
to cause investors and markets to overreact. These concerns require
serious attention.
Part III proposes limited regulatory changes designed to better
manage the public release of personal facts about public company

he was fired); Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/11/sexsellscontrl.html
(Nov. 12, 2005) (raising disclosure questions about a CEO's affair with a
subordinate).
8. See David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Sets Probe as CEO Apologizes, WALL
ST. J., July 18, 2007, at A3; David Kesmodel & Jonathan Eig, Unraveling
Rahodeb: For Whole Foods CEO, A History of Brashness, WALL ST. J., July 20,
2007, at Al; David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Whole Foods Is Hot, Wild Oats a
Dud-So Said 'Rahodeb',WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007, at Al.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933,
ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404,
§ 1, 48 Stat. 881).
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executives.
The proposed regulatory changes are designed to
minimize the identified defects in the current federal disclosure
scheme as it applies to personal facts about executive officers-and
to do so at a minimal additional cost. The suggested adjustments
work within the overall parameters of current disclosure regulation
as reflected in related statutory and decisional law. In addition, the
proposal for change may have collateral corporate governance
benefits.
Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
I.
EXISTING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO FACTS ABOUT PUBLIC COMPANY
EXECUTIVES

The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act principally exist to protect
investors in, and to promote and sustain the integrity of, the U.S.
securities markets.1 The chief means used by and under these laws
to achieve their core policy objectives is the public disclosure of
investor-relevant information. 12 This public disclosure is compelled
by mandatory disclosure provisions and antifraud rules contained in
the statutes, in regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), and in federal judicial decisions. In explaining
the perceived need for mandatory disclosure rules, one pair of noted
securities law scholars states that "[i]mplicit in both the 1933 and
1934 Acts is the Brandeisian philosophy that mandatory disclosure
is likely to deter not only conflicts of interest and waste of corporate
assets but also other wrongful conduct by managers or outside
controlling security holders. 1 3 As to antifraud rules that compel
disclosures, one scholar summarizes their role as follows:
[T]he antifraud provisions are extremely important in
inducing voluntary disclosure.
Nevertheless, antifraud
regulation alone is unlikely to induce the level of voluntary
disclosure that economists associate with full scale unraveling.
Absent additional methods of signaling or regulation, issuers
would withhold significant amounts of material firm-specific
information and investors would be able to make only
imprecise inferences regarding issuer candor and integrity
11. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND ANALYsIs 1 (2005); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of

the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 194 (2006).
12. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 11, at 1; JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (5th ed. 2006); MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1 (4th ed. 2004).
13. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 675-76 (3d ed.
1989).
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14
based on information that the issuer voluntarily discloses.

Thus, both mandatory disclosure rules and antifraud rules are
designed to work hand-in-hand to protect investors and promote
market integrity. The remainder of this Part describes both types of
rules as they relate to public revelations of facts about executive
officers under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
Mandatory Disclosure
Most of the required disclosures applicable to public companies
under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act relate to corporate disclosures
of corporate facts-information coming from and relating to the
corporation itself and transactions in which the corporation is
involved. However, these federal disclosure requirements also
include rules that compel disclosure by and about executive officers
of public companies.

A.

Disclosure by Executive Officers About Themselves
1.
For example, an executive, as an affiliate of a public company
issuer under the meaning of Rule 144(a)(1) under the 1933 Act, 15
must file a Form 144 before offering or selling, during any period of
three months, a specified amount of securities (over 500 shares or
other units, or shares or units having an aggregate sale price in
excess of $10,000) of the issuer in the public market without
registration. 16 Form 144 requires disclosure of the name and
address of the executive, as well as transaction-related information
(including the name and contact information for the transacting
broker or market maker). 7 In addition, an executive must report his
or her ownership of and transactions in the public company's
securities on Forms 3, 4, and 518 in order to comply with Section

14. Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud ProhibitionsAre Not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for

Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223, 277.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2007).
16. Id. § 230.144(h).
17. Form 144: Notice of Proposed Sale of Securities Pursuant to Rule 144
under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 239.144, available at
http://www.sec.gov/abouttforms/forml44.pdf.
18. Form 3: Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities, 17
C.F.R. § 249.103, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form3.pdf
[hereinafter Form 3]; Form 4: Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership,
17 C.F.R. § 249.104, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4.pdf
[hereinafter Form 4]; Form 5: Annual Statement of Changes in Beneficial
available at
§ 249.105,
17
C.F.R.
of Securities,
Ownership
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form5.pdf [hereinafter Form 5].
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16(a) of the 1934 Act.' 9 These forms require disclosure of the
executive's name and address (which may be a business address), as
well as information relating to the ownership of the reported
securities, which may be personal in nature. 20 And if an executive
should acquire beneficial ownership of more than five percent of an
outstanding class of publicly traded securities, he or she must report
those holdings by filing a Schedule 13D report and making
subsequent adjustment filings, as required.2 1 An executive filing a
Schedule 13D must disclose personal facts (name, residence or
business address, employment information, significant criminal
convictions, citizenship, etc.), 22 as well as facts relating to the
transaction, some of which may also have personal elements (e.g.,
the source of funds for the subject securities acquisition).23 Each of
these executive disclosure duties requires the executive to make a
filing that includes limited personal facts in connection with
personal stock ownership and transactions, but in each case the
disclosure is triggered only by transactions in securities of the public
company for which the executive serves.
2.
Disclosure by Public Companies About Their Executive
Officers
Also, both registration requirements of the 1933 Act and
periodic,
proxy-related,
and transaction-triggered
disclosure
requirements in and under the 1934 Act require public companies to
make specified disclosures about personal facts relating to their
executive officers.
These disclosures are mandated by the
requirements of numerous different disclosure forms (e.g., Forms S1 and S-3 under the 1933 Act, 24 Form 10-K and Schedule 14A under
the 1934 Act, 25 etc.). As a result of SEC initiatives (first adopted in
the early 1980s) to standardize and integrate disclosure
requirements under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, many of the
requirements of these various forms liberally reference specialized,
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000). To enforce these reporting requirements, public
companies are required to disclose known late filings and filing failures relating
to these reporting requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 229.405.
20. See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l(a), -2(a); Schedule 13D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/schedl3d.pdf.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101.
23. Id.
24. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, available at http://www.sec.gov/
aboutlforms/forms-l.pdf; Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-3.pdf.
25. Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/forml0-k.pdf; Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/sched14a.pdf.
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non-financial disclosure requirements listed in a central, standard
"menu" of mandatory disclosure rules known as Regulation S-K.26
The mandatory disclosure rules in Regulation S-K require that
public companies make various disclosures relating to their
executive officers in four overarching subject matter areas: personal
and professional biographical data, including family relationships
among corporate constituents and involvement in certain legal
proceedings; compensation; ownership of corporate securities; and
potential conflicting interest transactions.2 7 So, for example, on a
regular basis, a public company must disclose: each executive's age,
five-year employment history, term of office, and arrangements or
understandings with respect to his or her service as an executive
officer; 28 the nature of any family relationship between or among
each executive and any director, executive officer, or person
nominated or chosen by the corporation to become a director or
executive officer; 29 each executive's filings of or specified30
involvements in bankruptcy proceedings within a five-year period;
criminal convictions of and pending actions against each executive
within a five-year period (with certain exceptions for de minimis
criminal activity);3 ' curtailment of specified business-related
activities of each executive through court or administrative orders,
decrees, and judgments within a five-year period;32 and violations by
each executive of federal or state securities or commodities law
within a five-year period. 3 Moreover, on a periodic basis, each
public company is required to describe in detail (in many cases, in a
chart-based format) both the nature and amount of each element of
compensation (cash and non-cash, under plans and otherwise) it
pays to each of the "named executive officers" (its principal executive
officer and principal financial officer, its three other most highly
compensated executive officers, and up to two others as designated
under the rule),34 as well as the number and percent of each class of
the corporation's securities beneficially owned by each of the "named
executive officers."35 And finally,3 6 a public company must regularly
26. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-1123.
27. See id. §§ 229.401-.404.
28. Id. § 229.401(b), (e).
29. Id. § 229.401(d).
30. Id. § 229.401(f)(1).
31. Id. § 229.401(f)(2).
32. Id. § 229.401(f)(3), (4).
33. Id. § 229.401(f)(5), (6).
34. Id. § 229.402.
35. Id. § 229.403(b).
36. Not noted here, but noted earlier, is an additional requirement that the
corporation report executives' late filings and filing failures under mandatory
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disclose transactions that it has entered into with its executive
officers or entities in which its executive officers are principals or
have leading or controlling roles.37 All of this information is, in some
way, personal to the executive, although much of it (other than, for
example, age, employment history, and involvement with personal
legal actions) also involves the corporation in a relatively direct way.
3. Disclosure by Executive Officers and Public Companies
Under Gap-FillingRules
Regulations under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act include,
among their disclosure provisions, "gap-filling" rules that require, in
addition to statements mandated by line-item requirements,
disclosure of any further material information necessary to make
the required statements not misleading. 38 Nothing in the gap-filling
rules or related guidance excludes executives' personal facts from
the information that may be subject to disclosure: After identifying
additional information that may be necessary to contextualize
mandatory line-item disclosures, the key determination that must
be made in complying with the applicable gap-filling rule is whether
that information is "material."4 °
"The term material, when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would attach importance" in making an
investment decision. 4'
This regulatory definition codifies one
formulation of the materiality standard first articulated in the proxy
fraud context by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.

disclosure rules applicable to executives themselves. See supra note 19.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a).
38. See id. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20.
39. In fact, Professor Jayne Barnard has expressly noted that a gap-filling
rule may compel disclosure of an individual's prior bad acts. Jayne W. Barnard,
Rule 10b-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47 ARiz. L. REv. 9, 19 (2005).
40. Materiality is also a significant disclosure predicate under the fraud
proscriptions described infra Part I.B. and under stock exchange rules
(although the definition of materiality under stock exchange rules may be
different). See, e.g., NADAQ, Inc., Regulatory Requirements 8 (July 2007),
available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/RegRequirements.pdf,
NYSE,
Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 201.00-204.00 (2002), available
at
http://www.nyse.comFrameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/
regulation/listed/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcmsection.html;
see
also Barnard, supra note 5, at 323-24 (mentioning materiality as a determinant
of disclosure under New York Stock Exchange and National Association of
Securities Dealers rules then in effect).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405; see also § 240.12b-2.

2007]

DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVES' PERSONAL FACTS 757

Northway, Inc. ,42 and later adopted for use in materiality
considerations for purposes of Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act ("Rule
10b-5")43 in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.44 It is possible that a court would
find that there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance to personal information about an
executive. 5 Accordingly, the gap-filling rules may require public
disclosure of executives' personal facts.
B.

Disclosure Compelled by Antifraud Rules
Antifraud rules under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act may
similarly compel disclosure of personal facts about executives.
Antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws, when they
are invoked, act as broad gap-filling disclosure rules.46 For example,
Section 17 of the 1933 Act47 "makes unlawful transactions involving
material misstatements and omissions." 48 Rule 10b-5, modeled after
Section 17, 49 does the same.50 Rule 10b-5 is at issue in huge

42. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The definition of "material" in the gap-filling
rules was adopted in response to the TSC decision. See Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,393-94 & n.67 (Mar. 16, 1982).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
44. 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
45. See Barnard, supra note 5, at 323-25 (analyzing generally the
materiality of a CEO's serious illness).
46. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of
Insider Trading:A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1193 (2003) (making
this point about Rule 10b-5 in the insider trading context).
47. Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000).
48. Adam D. Hirsh, Comment, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities
Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 955-56 (1990).
49. Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Ret. Plan v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 698
F.2d 320, 323 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Rule 10b-5 tracks section 17(a) closely . . .");
Douglas M. Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder Era:
The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L. REV. 50, 56
n.16 (1977) ("Largely tracking the language of section 17(a), the Commission
adopted rule 10b-5 proscribing fraud and other types of conduct 'in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.'"); Paula J. Dalley, From Horse
Trading to Insider Trading: The HistoricalAntecedents of the Insider Trading
Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1290 n.4 (1998) ("The language of Rule
10b-5 comes from section 17(a) .... ."); Milton Freeman, Remarks at the
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws (Nov. 18-19, 1966),
in 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967); Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital
Directly From Investors: What Disclosure Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CoRP.
L. 111, 115 (2002) ("Rule 10b-5 was copied from section 17."); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Wrong Decision, But It Is Still Business
As Usual in the Securities Markets, 31 TULSA L.J. 509, 519 n.67 (1996) ("The
language of Section 17(a) is nearly identical to that of Rule 10b-5, the only
difference being that Section 17(a) applies only to fraud in connection with 'the
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numbers of transactions because, as it has been interpreted by the
courts, it is a wide-ranging proscription on manipulative and
deceptive conduct in connection with purchases and sales of
securities. 51 Specifically, Rule 10b-5 requires (among other things)
that "all material information disclosed by parties involved in
purchasing or selling securities be complete and correct" and that
"certain parties refrain from trading in particular securities unless
they disclose all material information in their possession." 2 Where
there is a duty to disclose (e.g., under mandatory disclosure rules or
when a public company or one of its executives is trading the
company's securities in the market), the entity or individual with
the duty is required to completely and accurately disclose all
material nonpublic information in its possession (or refrain from
trading).53 Similar fraud prevention rules relating to accurate and
complete disclosures of material facts are implicated in more
targeted transactional contexts, including proxy and tender offer
regulation under the 1934 Act.M A significant factor in determining
whether disclosures are required under these antifraud rules is
whether specific facts are material. Here, as with the gap-filling
rules, material facts are not restricted to corporate information.
Under the dual standards set by the U.S. Supreme Court in
TSC,
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote.... Put another way, there
offer or sale of any securities' and does not extend to purchases of securities as
does Rule 10b-5."); Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction for
Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions: The Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559,
562 n.23 (1988) ("[Section] 17(a) was the model for rule 10b-5.").
50. Peoria Union, 698 F.2d at 323 ("Both section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5
forbid using misrepresentations (including omissions of material fact) to sell
'securities.'"). Section 17 expressly prohibits fraud in connection with the offer
or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
51. Peoria Union, 698 F.2d at 323.
52. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger
Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1218, 1218-19 (1987) (noting these attributes with respect to Rule 10b-5).
This description effectively encompasses both traditional applications of Rule
10b-5 and insider trading claims. Both types of claims were made against
Martha Stewart in connection with her December 2001 ImClone stock sale. See
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to
Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1646-74 (2004) (describing
the current state of law on duties to disclose and materiality determinations
under Rule 10b-5).
54. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9, .14e-3 (2007).
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must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
altered the 'total mix' of
investor as having significantly
55
information made available."

TSC involved questions of proxy fraud under Rule 14a-9 under the
1934 Act. 56 Twelve years after TSC, in Basic Inc. v.Levinson, the
U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the use of these same two materiality
formulations under Rule 10b-557 and also established a test for use
in applying the standard to assessments of the materiality of
contingent or speculative information (in that case, premerger
negotiations). 5' This materiality test for contingent or speculative
information-current information relating to a potential future
event or condition-involves balancing the probability of the future
event or condition occurring against the magnitude of the future
event or condition. 59

Although personal facts about an executive are less likely to be
material than corporate facts, ° a court may find that it is
substantially likely that a reasonable investor would consider
certain personal facts important in making an investment decision
relating to the corporation's securities. Moreover, a court may find
it substantially likely that a reasonable investor would have viewed
disclosure of an omitted personal fact about an executive officer as a
significant alteration of the total mix of available information. In
this regard, it is important to note that executives' personal facts
may be contingent or speculative information, as they relate to the
public company in which the executive serves. News of a possible
criminal prosecution or a terminal illness, for example, is important
not just as a statement of current fact, but also as information that
may impact the future of the public company. Accordingly, in those
balancing test
circumstances, Basic's probability/magnitude
presumably would be used in gauging materiality.
II. CURRENT FEDERAL DISCLOSURE DUTIES WITH RESPECT TO
PERSONAL FACTS ARE INADEQUATE
This Part assesses the efficacy of the current system of federal
securities regulation in managing disclosures of personal facts about
55. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
56. Id. at 460-63.
57. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
58. Id. While the Court restricted use of this test to the facts at issue in the
case, id. at 232 n.9, lower courts and practitioners seemingly routinely use the
test in other circumstances involving contingent or speculative information. See
Heminway, supra note 46, at 1160 n.114.
59. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238-39.
60. See infra Part II.A.3.
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executives. Both the analysis that follows and the related proposal
for change set forth in Part III of this Article are built on certain
important assumptions and other premises. This Part begins with a
recitation of these foundational principles and continues by detailing
three deficiencies in the current disclosure regime as applied to the
disclosure of executives' personal facts. Specifically, existing rules
governing the disclosure of personal facts afford too much discretion
to executives, unnecessarily pressure important individual rights,
and promote disproportionate reactions by investors and the
market.
A. Basic Premises in the Analysis of the Existing Disclosure
Regime
This Article assumes that the existing overall disclosure regime
described in Part I (consisting of mandatory disclosure rules and
antifraud provisions) is here to stay, for better or for worse.
Accordingly, the Article works within that regime to suggest ways to
better effectuate disclosure policy and to better fulfill the theoretical
promise of disclosure regulation.
1.
Materiality Analysis Under the Antifraud Rules Is a Key
PressurePoint
In this existing system of disclosure regulation, it is
significantly easier to comply with mandatory disclosure rules than
it is to comply with disclosure compelled by antifraud rules. This is
true for several reasons. First, it is relatively simple to ascertain
when compliance with mandatory disclosure rules is required.
Public companies and their executives by and large know when
events or transactions involve filings, and the line items in each
form reference required information, either directly or indirectly
(i.e., by reference to integrated disclosure requirements in
Regulation S-K or Regulation S-X61). Although line-item mandatory
disclosure rules are not completely transparent, they do provide
relatively clear disclosure guidance, as compared with the guidance
provided in gap-filling and antifraud rules. In contrast, disclosures
made strictly to comply with antifraud rules (i.e., not in response to
line-item or gap-filling mandatory disclosure requirements) are
triggered by the existence of a duty to make all material information
This duty to disclose may arise in a variety of
public.6 2
circumstances. For example, disclosing persons have a duty to
correct information previously disclosed that was inaccurate when

61. See 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2007); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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the disclosure was made.63 In certain circumstances, disclosing
persons also may have a duty to update information that, while
accurate when disclosed, has become inaccurate with the passage of
time and, perhaps, the occurrence of other intervening events.64 In
addition, when public companies and their executives (among
others) trade in the public company's securities, they assume a duty
to disclose.65 It often is not easy to recognize whether and when a
duty to disclose exists. 66
Second, mandatory disclosure rules often are more transparent
in conveying disclosure content. The determination of what to
disclose under these rules often is straightforward, since line-item
disclosure requirements can be quite pointed (e.g., name, age, fiveyear employment history, etc.). 67 Even where these requirements
are qualified by materiality, the qualification typically applies to
specific types of information (e.g., legal proceedings, properties, etc.)
rather than all information.68 However, even assuming knowledge
of the existence of a disclosure duty, the determination of what to
disclose to comply with an antifraud rule alone tends to rely heavily
on a difficult materiality determination of "facts." "Matters of
materiality .

.

. are often difficult to work through confidently, and

courts have not been solicitous in cases of reliance on counsel." 9
Materiality determinations are open-textured; the wording of the
relevant antifraud rules is quite broad and susceptible to multiple
interpretations, even with SEC and federal court guidance.
Materiality analyses also involve consideration of both quantitative
and qualitative factors. ° Moreover, materiality assessments are
more easily made ex post than ex ante given the incompleteness of
ex ante information. 71 Although materiality judgments also may be
involved in disclosure assessments made under line-item disclosure
rules (and certainly are involved in assessments made under the
gap-filling rules), the real stress in making materiality
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 53, at 1669.
See id. at 1664-69.
See id. at 1654-64.
See id. at 1640-42.
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b), (e) (2007).
See, e.g., id. §§ 229.102-.103.
Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities

Fraud,38 ARIz. L. REV. 639, 644 (1996).

70. John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and
Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 46-47 (1998);

Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair
Disclosure Unconstitutional?,39 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2005).

71. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961
n.23 (1995) (referencing this issue with respect to insider trading assessments
under Rule 10b-5).
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determinations is created by antifraud rule compliance.72
2. Personal Facts About Executives May Be Material on
Several Different Bases
Given that disclosure questions with respect to executives'
personal facts generally involve compliance with gap-filling and
antifraud rules and that materiality is vital in disclosure
determinations under these rules, it is important to understand the
possible bases for materiality of personal facts about executives.
Personal facts about an executive may be important to a reasonable
investor or have a significant impact on available public information
because they may indicate the possibility that the corporation will
be without the executive's services either temporarily or
permanently.73 For example, if an executive will be involved as a
party in a criminal or civil trial, the executive will lose time away
from his or her duties to the corporation during that time. And a
conviction in a criminal trial may result in the executive serving jail
time or other detention that will keep him or her away from the
Similarly,
office, perhaps for a more extended period of time.
serious or terminal illness requires treatment and time for recovery,
and if treatment fails to completely cure the condition, permanent
disability, incapacity, or death may result." These effects of illness
limit or terminate the executive's ability to render services to the
Investors may find an executive's unavailability
corporation.
especially important in making an investment decision as to a
corporation's securities if the executive has a unique expertise or
specialized skill critical to the corporation's successful operations.76
Generally, an executive's absence is more likely to be considered
important by a reasonable investor if his or her management or
other functions are not adequately covered by others or the
72. The importance of materiality determinations throughout federal
securities regulation is widely recognized. See, e.g., Cox ET AL., supra note 12,
at 580 (referring to the materiality concept as "a workhorse in securities
regulation").
73. See SEC v. Elecs. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 67 (D. Conn. 1988)
(noting that a chief executive officer's "indictment was likely to make him
'unavailable'" to the public company he served, "either through his proposed
resignation, his need to prepare a defense and stand trial, or through the
possibility of incarceration").
74. Martha Stewart, for example, served five months in jail and was
subsequently under house arrest for more than five months (although not for
insider trading, the alleged crime originally investigated).
75. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 5, at 539 n.16, 550 n.65, 554, 557 & n.111,
562, 590 n.279 (referencing permanent disability, incapacity, or death resulting
from an executive's illness).
76. Barnard, supra note 5, at 324.
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executive continues to earn compensation from the corporation
during a period of absence from his or her corporate duties.
However, service limitations are not the only potential bases for
the materiality of personal facts about executives.
Personal
information about executive officers also may be important to a
reasonable investor or have a significant impact on available public
information because the executive has unique attributes that benefit
the corporation independent of his or her overall service availability
and capabilities. For example, when the reputation of the executive
and the corporation are tied, especially because the executive's
identity effectively is the corporation's brand 77 or the executive is
71
otherwise iconic, personal facts about the executive may be more
important to investors or have a more significant informational
effect. Also, the reliability or integrity of certain key members of
management may form the basis of a materiality determination,
depending on the personal information at issue.7 9
77. This basis for materiality played an important role in the criminal
securities
fraud
charge brought
against
Martha Stewart.
See
Cynthia A. Caillavet, Comment, From Nike v. Kasky to Martha Stewart: First
Amendment Protection for Corporate Speakers' Denials of Public Criminal
Allegations, 94 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1039 n.36 (2004).
78. A recent column describes iconic chief executive officers as being either
founders ("birthers") or "those who built a new company on the ashes of
an old business" ("builders").
C. Warren Neel, Column, Balance
of
Power:
Boards,
'Birthers' and
Builders,
DIRECTORS
&
BOARDS, Apr. 2007, http://directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/April2007/
ColumnApril2007.html; see also Elecs. Warehouse, 689 F. Supp. at 67 (noting, in
a materiality assessment, that a chief executive officer's indictment "cast a
cloud upon the bona fides" of the public company he served, "which was
essentially the alter ego" of the executive). These iconic executives may even
use personal publicists and other professionals "to extend their public image
beyond that of the firm." Neel, supra. This behavior increases the likelihood
that investors and publicly available information will be impacted by the
executives' personal facts.
79. See SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829-30 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-73 (1964). Management
integrity is, however, a disfavored basis for materiality. See Fedders, supra
note 70, at 42, 46-47 ("Those trying to parse the obligations concerning
management integrity through the SEC's imprecise standard became vocal
opponents of the new standard. Then, when the SEC stubbornly refused to
promulgate rules designed to fill in the details of a broadly stated qualitative
standard of materiality, its initiatives suffered fatal consequences."). Yet, in
spite of its disfavor, the SEC persists in asserting the applicability of
management integrity as a basis for materiality.
See, e.g., SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm; see also Caroline A. Antonacci,
Note, SAB 99: Combating EarningsManagement with a Qualitative Standard
of Materiality, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 75, 81-94 (2001) (summarizing decisional
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Ultimately, the materiality of personal facts about executive
officers determined on any of these bases should depend on an
assessment of the specific capabilities or attributes of the executive,
their importance (financially or otherwise) to the value of the public
company that the executive serves, and the market for executive
talent. If the executive is more fungible (easily replaceable without
considerable cost to the corporation), his or her personal information
should be less important to investors or less significant to the total
mix of available information.
Although almost every public
company undoubtedly would, if prompted, indicate that its chief
executive officer and other key executives are important to its
business, many will not, without significant thought, be able to
indicate precisely why. In many cases, executives are relatively
fungible, even if they are talented, intelligent, and knowledgeable
about the corporation and its business.
3.
Personal Facts About Executives Are Less Likely to Be
Material than CorporateFacts
Even where an executive is not fungible, personal facts about
the executive are less likely to be important to the reasonable
investor or less significant to the total mix of available information
than corporate facts. Executives' personal facts are less likely to be
directly related to fundamental corporate value and are less apt to
impact corporate behavior (apart from the potential for a change in
the executive's management responsibilities or a termination of the
executive's management or employment status). The value of a
public company to its shareholders and others is comprised of many
components and can be measured in numerous ways. But it is safe
to say that most personal facts about executives have little impact
on the corporation's assets, profitability, stability, earnings or
growth potential, efficiency (by any measure), or any other
fundamental internal value metric when compared with information
about the corporation's products or services, financial condition, or
results of operations. Of course, public disclosure of a personal fact
about an executive may affect the short-term price of the
corporation's stock, but that price effect does not necessarily indicate
that the personal fact is material.80
Personal facts about public executive officers also are less likely

law and SEC action regarding qualitative materiality).
80. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through
CounterfactualMaterialityand Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for
a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
137, 142 (2007) ("Not all information that is interesting to investors and
analysts is material to the financial condition of a company.").
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to be qualitatively important to the public company. Although the
SEC has promoted the possibility that facts related to management
competence, reliability, and integrity may be material, there are few
court cases expressly endorsing qualitative materiality.8 1 In fact, at
least one case appears to outright reject qualitative materiality,
noting that the SEC can and should provide for mandatory
disclosure in areas raising the potential for qualitative materiality
claims.82 Based on existing*decisional law, qualitative materiality is
most likely to exist where the facts include concealment of selfdealing transactions or illegal activities.8 3 However, self-dealing
claims cannot be converted from state law fiduciary duty claims to
federal securities fraud claims without allegations of manipulation
84
or deception (including principally false or misleading disclosures).
B. The Existing DisclosureRegime Places Too Much Discretion in
the Hands of Executive Officers
Current federal securities law applicable to disclosure of private
facts about executives divides mandatory disclosure responsibilities
between the executive and the corporation. Public companies have
adopted compliance policies and other methods for reminding
executive officers of the executives' reporting requirements under
the federal securities laws and have established systems for
capturing information from their executive officers that enable the
companies to comply with their SEC reporting responsibilities. 5 For
81. See supranote 79 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986)
("We hold that at least so long as uncharged criminal conduct is not required to
be disclosed by any rule lawfully promulgated by the SEC, nondisclosure of
such conduct cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution."). The Matthews
court rested its decision on both the history of the SEC's attempts to assert the
applicability of a qualitative materiality analysis and due process concerns
arising out of a lack of adequate notice of criminal wrongdoing. Id.
Interestingly, in terms of history, the Matthews case notes that the initial SEC
focus on qualitative materiality occurred as a result of post-Watergate concerns
about disclosure integrity. Id. at 47-48. The post-Enron era exhibits similar
attributes (each era being comprised of, among other things, various regulatory
reactions to actual and perceived abuses of trust), which underlie the concern
about disclosure of executives' personal facts.
83. See id. at 48 ("We found merit in the plaintiffs claim of wrongdoing
only insofar as it alleged self-dealing by the defendant directors, a matter
'explicitly covered by SEC disclosure regulations."'); supra note 79.
84. Matthews, 787 F.2d at 48-49.
85. A typical compliance device is a questionnaire distributed on an annual
basis by the public company to its directors and officers, commonly known as a
"D&O Questionnaire." See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 53 S.E.C. 235, 240
(1997) ("The Company provided Grace, Jr. with directors' and officers'
questionnaires ('D&O Questionnaires') in the course of preparing its 1992 Form
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the most part, these systems seem to work well in encouraging
accurate, complete, and timely public disclosures.86
1.
Disclosure Decisions Relating to
Complex

Personal Facts Are

However, in determining their own and their corporation's
disclosure obligations with respect to executives' personal facts,
public company executives are required to make important decisions
under gap-filling and antifraud rules with respect to the public
release and dissemination of noncorporate information of a personal
nature-noncorporate information that is outside the scope of lineitem mandatory disclosure requirements. Some of these decisions
are, no doubt, quite difficult.
Although other issues also may make for challenging disclosure
assessments (e.g., whether disclosure of a fact is necessary in order
to make existing statements not misleading), materiality
determinations are perhaps the most tricky. Many people may have
an intuition about what may be material; but the decision is a mixed
question of law and fact 7 and, as such, typically is outside the
10-K and 1993 proxy statement and its 1993 Form 10-K and 1994 proxy
statement."); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139,
1221 (2005) ("Fastow was required to provide Enron with information about his
interest in the LJM transactions in his response to a questionnaire sent
annually to directors and officers."); see also A.A. Sommer, Jr., Internal
Controls, 61 N.C. L. REV. 505, 513-14 (1983) (noting the role of annual
questionnaires in helping to ensure compliance with Form 4 filings). D&O
Questionnaires help public companies keep track of certain personal
information about executives (and others) on an annual basis. Also, many-if
not most-public companies have securities trading compliance policies, some of
which provide for preclearance of securities trades by corporate officers. See
Steven Chasin, Insider v. Issuer: Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading
Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (2003). These
compliance policies give public companies both personal stock information and
knowledge, if not control, of securities transactions by their executive officers.
Some public companies also supplement their D&O Questionnaires and
activities under their securities trading compliance policies with periodic
intracorporate communications that remind executives of their responsibilities
under federal securities laws.
86. But see In re Grace, 53 S.E.C. at 240-42 (noting lapses in executive
officers' responses to D&O Questionnaires and compliance with other
procedures designed to ensure corporate compliance with annual disclosure
requirements).
87. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)
("The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and
fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of
facts."); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The
determination of materiality is a mixed question of law and fact that generally
should be presented to a jury."); United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 380
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expertise of the executive. With the applicable law consisting of two
principal formulations of a materiality standard and a subsidiary
test used to assess contingent or speculative information,
materiality-especially qualitative materiality-is an elusive
concept even for some well-trained legal counsel. 8
2. Disclosure Decisions Relating to Personal Facts May Be
Highly Stressful and Emotionally Charged
Worse yet, executives must make these decisions in what may
be highly stressful or emotionally charged situations (e.g., under
threat of criminal prosecution or civil enforcement, in the wake of a
medical diagnosis of a serious or terminal illness, at a time of
financial strife, or during the course of a divorce or nonpublic
extramarital affair). Of course, it is impossible to remove emotions
from decision making completely. 9 But decision making in times of
stress, especially on matters involving a high level of sophistication
and focus, has a low probability of being accurate, rational, or
optimal. 90 Even if counsel is engaged by the executive to assist him
or her in making disclosure determinations, decision making may be
impacted by the strained personal environment surrounding the

(5th Cir. 1996) ("Because materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, it is
usually left for the jury."); SEC v. Shapiro, No. 4:05cv364, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17703, at *23 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2007) ("[Materiality is a mixed
question of law and fact."). Some commentators see materiality principally or
wholly as a question of fact. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 53, at 1644.
88. See Fedders, supra note 70, at 46-47.
89. See Benedict Sheehy, The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic
and JurisprudentialValues and the Future of CorporateLaw, 2 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L.J. 463, 471 (2004) ("[Plsychologists have demonstrated that humans are
unable to make rational decisions without emotions.").
90. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational
Understanding,"and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 140008 (2006) (noting, in a discussion of relevant research findings, that "[clertain
aspects of emotional experience unquestionably can distort rational decisionmaking: scholars have largely legitimated the folk wisdom, reflected in
numerous areas of legal doctrine, that emotion can be a powerful and
sometimes disruptive force"); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered
Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 51, 70 (2006) ("[Plarticularly in threatening or emotionally-charged
situations, the amygdala's evaluation and response occurs before the higher
cognitive processes in the frontal lobes can become fully engaged to rationally
analyze the situation."); Jeremy A. Matz, Note, We're All Winners: Game
Theory, The Adjusted Winner Procedure and Property Division at Divorce, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 1339, 1353 (2001) ("While negotiation assumes rational actors,
people in divorce do not always make decisions under the standard rational
choice model. Divorce is an emotional time and decisions will likely be affected
accordingly." (footnote omitted)).
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executive. 91
3. Disclosure Decisions Relating to Personal Facts May Be
Subject to Irrational Cognitive Processes and Result from
Behavioral Biases
Emotions are not, however, the only limitations on accurate,
rational, optimal decision making. Executive decision making on
disclosure of personal facts also may be influenced by heuristics and
behavioral biases. These processes and biases tend to favor underdisclosure by executives of their personal facts.
For example, public company executive officers are likely to
exhibit a self-serving or self-interest bias in making disclosure
determinations relating to personal facts. "[T]he self-serving bias
means, among other things, that people's judgments, including
judgments of fairness, tend to be influenced by their self-interest.
Even if people are trying to be fair, what seems fair to them is
inevitably influenced by what is in their own best interests." 92 It

would seem to be highly likely that an executive's decisions about
disclosure of personal facts would be influenced by this bias,
especially to the extent that he or she is protesting innocence during
a criminal investigation or desiring to keep illness, financial woes,
marital squabbles, or extramarital affairs from the public eye.
Moreover, public company executive officers may have the
tendency to "satisfice"-make decisions based on less than full
information, perhaps by adopting the first, or an early-identified,
suitable resolution. 8 Optimal materiality determinations are rich in
legal and factual detail and result from considered judgments, made
after considerable thought and consultation.
Satisficing, by
definition, has the capacity to create bad disclosure decisions in this
91. See Lorraine M. Bellard, Note, Restrainingthe Paternalismof Attorneys
and Families in End-of-Life Decision-Making While Recognizing That Patients
Want More Than Just Autonomy, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 803, 807-10 (2001)
(describing legal counsel's ability to assist clients with decision making relating
to terminal illness).
92. Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J.
417, 425 (2003); see also Thomas S. Ulen, Human Fallibility and the Forms of
Law: The Case of Traffic Safety, in THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 397, 409-10 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
93. See Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and
Without Regret, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL

BEHAVIOR,

supra

note 92, at 13, 14 ("[Mluch of the time, we come up with serviceable, if
imperfect, solutions ....
[W]e are 'satisficers,' not maximizers."); Robert A.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 145 (2000) (defining the
term "satisfice" as a rule-of-thumb heuristic in which the decision maker settles
for merely satisfactory decisions rather than optimizing).
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environment. One can imagine, for example, an executive deciding
to delay disclosure of an investigation, illness, financial or marital
difficulties, or an extramarital affair because of initial information
minimizing the actual or probable importance of that information.
Similarly, public company executives' disclosure decisions may
reflect a confirmation bias, "in that they seek out and process
information in such a way as to confirm pre-existing beliefs rather
than in a more optimally neutral manner."94 Further, cognitive
dissonance may operate independently from, or together with,
satisficing and the confirmation bias to buttress suboptimal choices.
Cognitive dissonance (or "path-dependence" 95) may enable executives
to disregard alternative solutions to problems once an initial
decision has been made.96 So, a self-serving or confirmation bias,
together with satisficing or cognitive dissonance, may operate on an
executive making a disclosure decision in the following ways:
" the executive might seek out, at least initially, only
information that minimizes the importance of an
investigation, illness, financial or marital difficulties, or an
extramarital affair;
" the executive then may decide for or against disclosure at the
outset based only on that information; and
" having made that decision, the executive will stay with and
support that decision in subsequent decision making, even
when new information indicates that the initial decision was
flawed.
Executive officers of public companies also may be subject to an
overconfidence bias. 97
Overconfidence may have the effect of
94. Prentice, supra note 92, at 424; Ulen, supra note 92, at 409.
95. See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing
CorporateFailures,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003) ("[Pleople will be over
committed to decisions they made, will often ignore or discount new information
that contradicts their belief that their prior decisions are correct, and will
remain wedded to those decisions even if they later obtain information that
should lead them to question the decisions.").
96. See Robert Cooter, Treating Yourself Instrumentally: Internalization,
Rationality, and the Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR,

supra note 92, at 95, 97-100; Prentice, supra note 92, at 424.
97. See Prentice, supra note 92, at 424.
Overconfidence is a common human tendency, and highly successful
people in particular have a tendency to overestimate their ability to
control their environments and to avoid harm. The problem of the
"overconfidence bias" is well-documented and recently has been
discussed in the law and behavioral science literature. An actor is
susceptible to this bias if she believes that the probability of a
negative event happening to her is less than the likelihood of the
event happening to someone else or, conversely, that it is more likely
that a positive event will happen to her than the likelihood that a
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distorting the importance of particular personal facts. For example,
an executive who is under investigation for criminal or civil
infractions may believe that he or she will not be indicted or subject
to suit because he or she "can beat this thing"-even when informed
judgments of legal counsel (and others) may be to the contrary.
Similarly, an executive may believe that a serious or terminal
illness, financial troubles, or divorce issues can be overcome or may
believe that an extra-marital affair can easily be handled or kept
under wraps. In this way, the overconfidence bias would tend to
minimize the importance of the relevant personal facts, making
disclosure less likely.
The immediacy bias98 (or availability heuristic99) and the
representativeness heuristic ° are apt to play roles in an executive's
determination of whether to disclose personal facts. An executive
may base a materiality analysis on recent examples of similar
circumstances involving other executives, rather than on an
The
independent analysis of his or her own circumstances.
circumstances of others may or may not be comparable when taken
in context, and the decisions of others may or may not have been
correct. Accordingly, these behavioral tendencies also may lead to
suboptimal decisions.
On a related note, public company executives may fall into timedelay traps, making it unlikely that they will take into account and
properly weigh long-term future effects of a current decision. 1°
Framing effects may further impact an executive's determinations
negative event will happen to her. This bias purportedly exists even if
the actor is an expert and even if she knows the actual probability
distribution of any particular event. Likewise, behavioral studies
suggest that people, especially successful ones, have an enhanced
sense of their abilities to control events in their lives and that they
will likely attribute positive outcomes to their own decision-making
abilities. These tendencies combine to encourage people to accept too
many risks based on their belief that adverse risks are unlikely to
occur and that, in any event, they can prevent harm from occurring.
Dickerson, supra note 95, at 5 (footnotes omitted); see also Ulen, supra note 92,
at 408-09.
98. See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary
Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324-26 (2003) (describing the immediacy
bias and terming it the "myopia bias").
99. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Is .the Mind Irrational or Ecologically Rational?,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL

BEHAVIOR,

supra note 92, at 37, 45-

46 (citing and describing various availability errors and effects).
100. See Prentice, supra note 92, at 425 (describing the heuristic as "the
tendency to judge probabilities via nonstatistical methods, for example, by
relying on salient examples rather than base rates").
101. See id. at 426 (describing a time-delay trap as "difficulty appreciating
the long-range implications of decisions" that results in a tendency "to value
immediate over delayed gratification").
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on the disclosure of personal facts.' °2 For example, the disclosure
question may be posed in such a way that law or facts bolstering the
possibility of immateriality are made more prominent than law or
facts supporting the possibility of materiality (or vice versa),
skewing decision making in favor of the outcome logically dictated
by the framing.
These cognitive errors and effects, when taken together with the
complexity and stress involved in making disclosure decisions
(especially materiality determinations) about personal facts, render
executives poor repositories for that decision-making process. Yet
our current disclosure system, which relies principally on gap-filling
and antifraud rules to foster disclosure of executives' personal facts,
leaves these difficult disclosure judgments to public company
Moreover, existing law and regulation provide
executives.
executives with no guidance on decision making in this
environment. If disclosure of personal facts is to be required and
encouraged, then the present system is deficient.
C. The Existing DisclosureRegime Creates Unresolved Tensions
with Individual Rights
Rights to privacy and free speech, as well as the right against
self-incrimination, are implicated in and challenged by disclosures
compelled under the federal securities laws." 3 This is especially
true for mandatory disclosure and antifraud rules associated with
the revelation of personal facts about executives.

102. See id. at 425.
103.

See generally, e.g., Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the

FirstAmendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990) (arguing that commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment and that certain elements of securities
regulation are inconsistent with the First Amendment); James D. Redwood,
QualitativeMateriality under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A
Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night?,
1992 WIs. L. REV. 315 (assessing the Fifth Amendment issues relating to

disclosures of unadjudicated illegal activities under the federal securities laws);
Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV.

687, 690-92 (1997) (describing tension between the 1933 Act and the First
Amendment); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817-18 (1980) (setting forth and
analyzing "three possible general levels of social attitude toward privacy and
disclosure" and applying them to analyze insider trading under Rule 10b-5);
David S. Nalven & Thomas A. Bockhorst, Taking the Fifth with the SEC: No
Longer an Easy Option, 40 BOSTON BAR J. 12, 12 (1996) (describing conflict

between disclosure obligations and self-incrimination); Glenn, supra note 5, at
543-44 (exploring tensions between the privacy rights under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and disclosure obligations under the federal securities
laws).
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Interference with the Right to Privacy

Privacy and the right to privacy are not well delineated, and the
legal basis for a right to privacy in the United States is variously
stated and attributed.04 However, one can distinguish two principal
forms of privacy--"information privacy" and "decisional privacy."'0 5
This Article essentially is concerned only with information privacyprivacy relating to "the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information.' °6 Information privacy is an interest that is recognized
to be rooted in tort law and constitutional law,' 7 as well as in an
increasing number of federal and state statutes.'0 8 Especially
relevant to the analysis here is Congress's enactment of legislation
protecting health care information and personal financial
information-two types of information encompassing earlier
identified common personal facts about executives that may be the
subject of difficult disclosure determinations under the federal
securities laws (e.g., executive illnesses and health treatments and
executive financial troubles).'0 9
The right to information privacy generally is conceptualized as
one or more legal protections relating to the public revelation of
personal information.
This conceptualization may involve
104. See, e.g., MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL
PRIVACY 3-21 (2003); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960);
Anita L. Allen, Privacy in American Law, in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL
EvALUATIONS 19, 19-36 (Beate Rbssler ed., 2004) [hereinafter PRIVACIES]; Beate
Rossler, Privacies:An Overview, in PRIVACIES, supra, at 1; Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Judith Jarvis Thompson,
The right to privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY

272,

272-87

(Ferdinand

D.

Schoeman ed.,

1984)

[hereinafter

PRIVACY

ANTHOLOGY]; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4

HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see also Amy L. Peikoff, The Right to Privacy:
Contemporary Reductionists and Their Critics, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 474
(2006) (surveying various articulations and bases for a right to privacy).
105.

DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1

(2006) (defining these two forms of privacy).
106. Id.
107. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (recognizing an
individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters).
108.

SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 105, at 26-33.

109. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C) (providing
for the handling of consumer financial information by financial institutions, and
also known as the "GLBA"); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (providing for, among other
things, regulatory action governing medical privacy, and also known as
"HIPAA"); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2006) (including federal regulations
governing medical privacy under HIPAA).
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protecting the secrecy of personal information or protecting the right
to determine whether, when, how, and to what extent personal
information is publicized." ° Protecting privacy, then, may not
necessarily involve preserving the nonpublic nature of personal
information so much as preserving individual control over the
release of personal information.
These protections may be important to individuals or society for
a variety of different reasons. For example, confidentiality or
personal choice may give an individual time and space for reflection
and growth. The precise interests to be protected and the extent of
legal protection for those interests necessarily are highly
contextual."'
Privacy in the context of federal securities regulation is limited.
Federal securities regulation involves governmental, rather than
corporate or individual, control over the public dissemination of
information. Disclosure regulation that brings facts to public light
that an individual otherwise would keep confidential creates
unavoidable tensions with individual privacy rights. It is clear from
the mandatory and antifraud disclosure rules described in Part I
that the SEC, under the power delegated to it by Congress, intends
that public company executives surrender some of their privacy
rights in favor of the compulsory public disclosure of facts about
them-at least to the extent that disclosure promotes the policies
underlying the federal securities laws. This is especially (but not
exclusively) true with respect to personal information about
executive officers that involves otherwise nonpublic matters at the
intersection of the corporation's relationship with its executives.
An insider of a corporation that is asking the public for funds
must, in return, relinquish various areas of privacy with
respect to his financial affairs which impinge significantly
upon the affairs of the company. That determination was
made by the Congress over 30 years ago when it expressly
provided in the Securities Act for disclosure of such matters as
remuneration of insiders and the extent of their shareholdings
in and the112nature of their other material transactions with the
company.

110.

ALAN F.

WESTIN,

PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim

of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.");
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) ("Privacy is not simply an
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control
we have over information about ourselves.").
111. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 119, 155-56 (2004).

112. In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964).
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However, Congress did not expressly strip executive officers of
their information privacy rights (or delegate authority to the SEC to
do so). Moreover, no court has found that individuals check all of
their information privacy rights at the door when they become
public company executives. Privacy protections for executives may,
in fact, serve both individual and corporate purposes."3
For
example, a highly qualified individual may be more sanguine about
accepting a position as a public company executive officer if he or
she is able to maintain the confidentiality of personal information to
a reasonable extent.
Moreover, a reasonable expectation of
information privacy may enable an executive to work more
efficiently and effectively, free from worry about unintended or
unknown public revelations or compelled disclosures of his or her
personal information. Accordingly, any obligation of an executive to
disclose confidential personal information should result from a
considered balancing of the public's need for an executive's personal
facts against the executive's desire to keep those facts private-ex
ante. The law often is responsible for performing that kind of
balancing.
Unfortunately, current federal securities disclosure rules do not
apparently recognize the tension they create with privacy rights or
provide a concrete basis or process for performing the requisite
balancing of governmental (or public) and individual interests.
Where a duty to disclose exists, what is material must be disclosed.
Only in the event that a legal challenge is mounted to a particular
disclosure requirement or its application in a specific context will
privacy rights be considered-ex post.
Accordingly, if a
harmonization of individual information privacy rights and federal
securities disclosure regulation is to occur under current law, the
federal courts are required to step in and perform the necessary
balancing in specific cases. This ex post, ad hoc means of handling
conflicts between privacy and disclosure is inefficient and
undesirable.
2.

Interference with the Right of Free Speech

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that
114
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."
This right to free speech, like the right to privacy, is complex and
variously defined." 5 "American free speech law is as much a product

113. Cf PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 213 (1995) (arguing that privacy is of value to the

individual and society in general).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
115. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
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of our history as it is a true deduction from valid premises. Its
contours are the result of particular struggles and compromises,
played out against the background of familiar doctrinal structures in
adjacent fields of public and private law."'1 6 In general, however,
constitutional free speech protections prevent the government from
restricting or otherwise regulating7 the expression of information,
including beliefs, views, and ideas."
Government may not suppress or regulate speech because it
does not like its content-unless it is obscene or demonstrably
defamatory. If government regulates the time, place or
manner of speech, it must regulate in a way that does not take
And if a government
sides between competing ideas.
regulation directed at other ends has the effect of restricting
speech, that regulation too must be neutral. 18
However, false speech is not protected." 9 Judicial scrutiny of
speech regulation employs a 120number of different standards,
depending on the factual context.

STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999)) (noting that there are varied theories of free

859, 859-60 (2000) (reviewing

speech under the First Amendment); Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic
Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 367, 383 (2004) ("First
Amendment doctrine is complicated, perhaps by necessity, given the range of
speech issues arising in a complex society.").
116. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 229 (1992).
117. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.");
Fried, supra note 116, at 234 ("The First Amendment does not protect a person
from lies or imposition by private individuals. Rather the First Amendment
protects against impositions by government-'Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech,' 'nor shall any state deprive any person ... [of
his free speech liberties].'" (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original)).
118. Fried, supra note 116, at 225.
119. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) ("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been
protected for its own sake."); Fried, supra note 116, at 238 ("Defamation and
deception are actionable wrongs .. .: they vindicate private rights invoked by,
or at least on behalf of, private individuals.").
120. Although this Article suggests the general propriety of an approach
that balances the governmental interest in protecting investors and markets
against free speech rights, no attempt is made here to assess whether
restrictions on speech involving personal facts about an executive deserve
heightened scrutiny, are entitled to a rational basis review, are subject to a due
process analysis, or would be evaluated under another standard. In a similar
context, two commentators note that
[diepending on how it chose to weigh the Supreme Court's precedents,
a court could apply rational review, intermediate Central Hudson
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Among the most inscrutable parts of U.S. free speech doctrine is
the area related to compelled speech-government regulation that
requires speech in circumstances where the speaker otherwise
would not communicate information to the public. 121 Sometimes
referred to as "negative free speech rights,"122 the right to avoid
compelled speech is a limited one, most often applied in cases
involving public media and individual expressions of a religious,
political, or ideological nature. 2 3 Historically, compelled commercial
speech has not been a well-protected area, largely because overall
commercial free speech rights have been limited. 12 4 However,
negative free speech rights have been validated in a commercial
speech is not
context 25 as long as the government-compelled
26
necessary to ensure consumer protection.
These guarantees of rights to free speech protect a variety of
important individual and societal interests. In a 1989 article about
speech in the context of capital markets, Professor Burt Neuborne
offered four principal "justifications" in defense of free speech:

review, or strict scrutiny. Regardless of the standard of review, a
court would analyze the nature of the government's interest and how
well the regulation relates to or fits the interest.
Page & Yang, supra note 70, at 66 (footnotes omitted) (making this point in
reference to a First Amendment analysis of the SEC's Regulation FD).
Accordingly, while the assessment of the appropriate review standard is beyond
the scope of this Article, that assessment likely would require a blending of
commercial and individual speech doctrines, and ultimately should involve a
balancing of the competing governmental interests, as suggested in this Article.
121. Professor Charles Fried captures this issue well:
The real trouble begins when this conception of the First Amendment
is pressed further to deny free speech protection to speakers who wish
not to pronounce certain views. The speech-as-silence principle has
been part of free speech law at least since the flag salute case, West
Virginia Board of Education v Barnette-which held that it is
unconstitutional to compel an unwilling speaker to speak.
Fried, supra note 116, at 227 (footnote omitted).
122. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 26 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Nicole B. Cdisarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 63 Mo. L. REV. 929, 948-50 (1998) (stating
that "[tihe fact that the First Amendment prohibits the state from compelling
speech of a religious, political, or ideological nature has been determined
beyond question" and illustrating the claim with applicable decisional law).
124. Id. at 947.
125. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 20-21. But see Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (failing to apply First Amendment
protection to government-mandated contributions to government-sponsored
industry advertising).
See generally Cdsarez, supra note 123, at 955-65
(describing and critiquing the Glickman case).
126. Csarez, supra note 123, at 950-53.

2007]

DISCLOSURE OFEXECUTIVES' PERSONAL FACTS 777

(1) The inherent correctness of respecting an individual's
attempt at self-expression;
(2) The wisdom of operating a 'free market in ideas' to assist in
discovering truth;
(3) The wisdom of enhancing the free flow of information to
assist persons in making lawful choices open to them; and
(4) The127inability of the government to function acceptably as a
censor.
Professor Neuborne's list of justifications contributes usefully to an
understanding of the rationales for the protections afforded by
constitutional rights to free speech by categorizing and consolidating
applicable underlying principles.
The compelled public disclosure of personal facts by an
executive (whether directly or by a corporation as a conduit for
information about the executive) 128 competes with an individual's (or,
where disclosure is made by a corporation, the corporation's) right to
control the timing, content, and manner of speech. 129 Various SEC
rules, together with related guidance and decisional law, may
compel speech about certain things, at specific times, in specific
documents, and in required formats.3 This compelled disclosure is
127. Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of
CapitalMarkets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 15 (1989).
128. Cf id. at 23 (indicating that courts may find it easier to regulate
conduits-like publishers of information about others-than speakers).
129. In fact, in a pretrial motion, Martha Stewart unsuccessfully sought to
dismiss the criminal securities fraud charge brought against her on First
Amendment grounds. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Martha Stewart at 17,
United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-3953(L)-cr);
Caillavet, supra note 77, at 1039 ("[P]rior to trial Stewart moved to dismiss
Count Nine based on a First Amendment defense, among others."). In response
to a subsequent pre-trial motion from the prosecution, the trial judge ruled that
Stewart's public statements about her personal stock trade were not protected
under the First Amendment and that Stewart could not raise her First
Amendment assertions at trial. Memorandum Opinion at 4, United States v.
Stewart
(No.
03
Crim.
717)
(Jan.
26,
2004),
available at
http://fll.findlaw.con/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspbl2604opn.
pdf; see Caillavet, supra note 77, at 1039-40 ("[The court] later held that
Stewart could not argue at trial the potential First Amendment problem posed
by Count Nine. Rather, the court ruled as a matter of law that Count Nine
poses no First Amendment problem because 'the First Amendment does not
protect false statements of fact that are part of a course of criminal conduct.'").
130. See Neuborne, supra note 127, at 51-54. SEC rules also may impose
prior restraints on speech. Professor Neuborne notes:
At least four aspects of the SEC's primary market speech regulations
raise serious first amendment issues: (1) forced disclosure by the
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intended to serve the policy interests underlying the securities laws:
investor protection and the maintenance of market integrity.
Although these policy interests often are consistent with Professor
Neuborne's justifications for free speech (especially the second and
third justifications-support for a truth-based free market in ideas
and choice-enhancing free information flow), they also may create
131
tensions with some or all of the principles underlying free speech.
By promoting mandatory disclosure and fraud protection (also
through disclosure), the securities laws and regulations use speech
regulation as a tool for protecting investors and maintaining market
integrity.
The tensions between the First Amendment and the federal
securities law scheme always have been noteworthy, but they are
increasingly important in our current post-Enron,' 31 post-SarbanesOxley,' 133 pro-disclosure world of securities regulation. Yet, scholarly
analyses of the speech regulation imposed by the federal securities
laws have been few and (sometimes) far between.' What has been
written to date tends to focus on the regulation of corporate speech
through compelled corporate transactional, periodic, and fraudissuer; (2) prior SEC approval of each registration statement and
prospectus; (3) restrictions on the contents of the registration
statement and the prospectus; and (4) restrictions on the form and
timing of pre- and post-prospectus promotional speech.
Id. at 59. Three of the four aspects (all aspects other than prior approval) apply
to periodic reporting as well as registration statement and prospectus issues.
131. Cf Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the FirstAmendment: A Central,
Complex, and Somewhat CuriousRelationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1109-10
(2006) ("[Tlhe complexity of the relationship between deception and the First
Amendment resides to a significant degree in the fact that the First
Amendment values of enlightenment and autonomy sometimes support-and
sometimes resist-government attempts to reduce deception.").
132. References to Enron in this Article are intended to invoke the period
commencing in late 2001 and extending through the summer of 2002, a time
during which massive corporate fraud was revealed at Enron Corp., WorldCom,
Inc. (now MCI, Inc.), and other large public companies.
133. Reference is made here to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scatted sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.),
which was enacted into law in the summer of 2002.
134. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance
Speech and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163 (1994); Lloyd L.
Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment
Constraints on the SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757 (2007);
Estreicher, supra note 103; Neuborne, supra note 127; Arthur R. Pinto, The
Nature of the Capital Markets Allows a Greater Role for the Government, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 77 (1989); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities
Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 613 (2006); Nicholas Wolfson, The FirstAmendment and the SEC,
20 CONN. L. REV.265 (1988).
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based disclosures.15 There is, however, a more broad and deep body
of literature relating to corporate speech in general commercial and
economic contexts that may play a role in better defining and
illuminating the relationship between the First Amendment and
securities regulation.
For example, most scholars concede that there is less of a First
Amendment interest in protecting corporate (or any commercial or
economic) speech than there is in protecting an individual's freedom
of speech. 136 Individual speech more clearly implicates the first of
Professor Neuborne's free speech justifications: support for
individual expression. Moreover, the federal securities laws do not
often regulate corporate speech in content areas that have been
traditionally among the most protected as crucial parts of the free
market in ideas and the free flow of information-namely, political
and religious communications
and scientific and artistic
expression. 137 And finally, the government may be a more acceptable
censor of corporate free speech than it is of individual free speech in
that corporate free speech rights exist only because of the existence
138
of the corporation itself, which is a matter of legislative grace.
Accordingly, based on Professor Neuborne's free speech
justifications, compelled speech by an individual in a corporate or
commercial context should be accorded more First Amendment
protection than speech by a corporationin a commercial or economic
context, principally because of the perceived interest in "respecting
an individual's attempt at self-expression" and, as a result of privacy
and other concerns not relevant to corporations, the "inability of the
135. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 127; Pinto, supra note 134.
136. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 127, at 5 ("Until recently, a structural
divide in first amendment theory provided effective protection to speech about
religion, politics, science, and art, but no protection at all to speech about
consumer affairs, labor relations, or capital formation. During the past decade,
the Supreme Court has shattered the symmetry of that structural divide by
affording significant, albeit limited, first amendment protection to speech about
consumer affairs."); Pinto, supra note 134, at 87 ("[Tlhe capital markets require
a lesser burden on the government to justify regulation in the face of an attack
under the first amendment.").
137. One scholar notes that
[flaws restricting commercial speech arguably do not result in
ideological traumas, yet they are still viewed as affecting the
advertiser's freedom of expression. Furthermore, the suggestion that
speakers must truly disagree with a message to be free from
compelled speech raises serious implications with respect to both
commercial and political speech.
Cdsarez, supra note 123, at 961.
138. It should be noted, however, that the federal government principally
engages in speech regulation in and under the securities laws, while states
typically charter corporations.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

139
government to function acceptably as a censor."
In addition, speech about personal facts should be accorded
more First Amendment protection than speech about corporatefacts.
Personal facts are less likely than corporate facts to assist investors
140
"indiscovering truth" or "inmaking lawful choices open to them."
However, personal facts do contribute to the free market of ideas
and free flow of information and, in certain circumstances (i.e.,
where the information, if disclosed, is substantially likely to affect
firm value), may assist investors in discovering truth and making
lawful choices. Moreover, in general, market integrity is promoted
by truthful, complete disclosures.
Given the tension between disclosure regulation and free speech
rights, a balancing of interests seems appropriate in judging the
constitutionality of speech compelled through federal securities
regulation, whether the disclosure is made by a corporation or an
individual and whether the disclosure involves corporate or personal
facts.14 '
Therefore, the substance of any securities regulation
compelling the disclosure of personal facts by or about executive
officers should allow for First Amendment concerns as well as the
need for investor and market protections. It is not clear that current
disclosure-oriented securities regulation-especially the broad-based
disclosures required under Rule lOb-5-appropriately accounts for
free speech rights by balancing the justifications for free speech
against the policies underlying the federal securities laws.

139. See supra text accompanying note 127.
140. See supra text accompanying note 127; supra Part II.A.3.
141. See Neuborne, supra note 127, at 41 (noting, in general, that "no
serious first amendment objection to forced disclosure exists so long as the
disclosures are demonstrably necessary to preserve hearers' capacity for
informed and/or autonomous choice"); Pinto, supra note 134, at 89-90 ("[11f the
regulation deals with mandatory disclosure or with the timing and form of
nonfraudulent speech, then it should not be invalidated under the first
amendment as long as the regulation is reasonably necessary for the protection
of investors and does not directly involve the traditional kinds of speech
protected by the first amendment." (footnote omitted)); id. at 87 ("IThe market
must be analyzed to determine who the hearers are, what they are hearing,
where the information comes from, how important the speech is to the potential
harm, and whether there are sufficient nongovernmental means to protect the
hearers." (footnotes omitted)); cf Csarez, supra note 123, at 965-77 (arguing
for use of the Central Hudson balancing test in determining the
constitutionality of any regulation that restrains or compels commercial
speech); Drury, supra note 134, at 773-75 (applying the Central Hudson
balancing test in a First Amendment analysis of the federal securities
regulation regime).
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Interference with the Right Against Self-Incrimination

Under the Fifth Amendment, "[n]o person... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."42 Despite its
seemingly restrictive language, this constitutional provision allows
an individual to assert a privilege against incriminating himself or
herself when disclosures of facts otherwise may be compelled both
inside and outside the criminal justice process, although invocations
may have different effects in criminal and civil
of the privilege
1.
143
proceedings.
The privilege protects both criminal suspects and
defendants,'" and is properly invoked when an individual has "a
reasonable apprehension that the requested testimony would either
'support a conviction' or 'furnish a link in the chain of evidence' that
could lead to prosecution." 4' Among other things, if invoked, the
self-incrimination privilege requires the prosecution to proceed
without testimony from the accused. 146 However, the privilege may
be waived by voluntary disclosure of incriminating facts. 47
Likely originating under English law, the right against selfincrimination is a foundational principle of civil society that protects
individuals from abusive inquisitions in connection with criminal
investigations and proceedings. 4 8 The self-incrimination privilege
also is rooted in individual autonomy, dignity, and privacy. 149 In
operation, when taken together with the Fifth Amendment rights to
a grand jury indictment and freedom from double jeopardy (retrial
for the same criminal offense), the right against self-incrimination
limits prosecutorial power in criminal proceedings." ° Although the
self-incrimination privilege also gives some clout to suspects and
defendants in criminal investigations and proceedings, its
protections do have limits. For example, an individual cannot assert
the self-incrimination shield of the Fifth Amendment to protect the
privacy of certain information and then attempt to later disclose and

142. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
INCRIMINATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION

144.

LAW,

THE

RIGHT

AGAINST

SELF-

3-6 (2001).

ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH,

at ix (2002).
145. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 143, at 5.
146. GARCIA, supra note 144, at ix.
147. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 143, at 6, 59-70.
148. Id. at 1-3; GARCIA, supra note 144, at 8-11; Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy

and self-incrimination,in PRIVACY ANTHOLOGY, supra note 104, at 245, 245-46.
149. GARCIA, supranote 144, at 11; Gerstein, supra note 148, at 246-54.
150. GARCIA, supra note 144, at ix ("Underlying these clauses is the axiom
that the government must not overpower the individual in the criminal
process.").
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use that same information to his or her benefit.'
The Fifth Amendment right to remain silent may conflict with
the pro-disclosure approach to federal securities regulation where
incriminating disclosure is required by the securities laws. In fact,
the right against self-incrimination may be invoked by an executive
to forestall disclosure of personal information that may constitute
material facts required to be disclosed under the federal securities
laws. 152 But, in the face of required disclosure of personal facts
under the federal securities laws, an executive may be forced to
choose between compliance with (or liability under) the federal53
securities laws and his or her constitutional right to remain silent.
Moreover, where an executive is pursued both civilly and criminally
for a failure to disclose material facts under Rule 10b-5, testimony
at a civil trial can be used against the testifying witness in a
subsequent criminal or civil trial. 54 Although this conflict is
seemingly unavoidable, securities rule making should take the
conflict into account and attempt to minimize it. Again, a rulemaking approach that carefully balances investor protection and
market integrity promotion against Fifth Amendment policies would

151. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 143, at 87-91.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1986)
("The issue ... is . . . whether section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and the SEC
rules enacted pursuant thereto required Matthews to state to all the world that
he was guilty of the uncharged crime of conspiracy."); Report of Investigation in
the Matter of the Cooper Companies, Inc. as it Relates to the Conduct of
Cooper's Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35082,
1994 SEC LEXIS 3975, at *13 n.9 (Dec. 12, 1994) ("The fact that an officer or
director of a public company has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self incrimination does not negate a public company's disclosure
obligations under the federal securities laws."); see also Redwood, supra note
103 (analyzing and minimizing the potential conflict between federal proxy
disclosure requirements and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination).
153. For example, Martha Stewart asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege
by declining to testify about the facts relating to the personal stock transaction
at the center of her criminal trial, which included a securities fraud charge
based on misstatements and omissions of material facts about that very stock
transaction. Julie Hilden, Should Martha Stewart's Lawyer Have Strongly
15,
2004,
WRIT,
Mar.
FINDLAw
to
Testify?,
Advised
Her
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20040315.html (discussing the pros and
cons of Stewart's decision to exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to testify
at her trial).
154. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 143, at 75-77. However, a
defendant may be able to obtain a stay of civil proceedings until the full
prosecution of parallel criminal actions or obtain a protective order. Id. at 131-
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seem like a sensible strategy.

55

D. The Existing Disclosure Regime Likely EncouragesInvestor and
Market Overreactions
Personal facts about an executive may be less likely to impact
firm value than corporate facts because personal facts typically are
less directly related to corporate operations. 56 Yet, an executive's
personal facts may engender significant public interest. Some of
that public interest may translate into investor or market behavior
that is out of proportion to the effect of the personal facts on firm
value, especially in the short term. This effect likely is exacerbated
by the open-textured nature of current federal securities disclosure
rules applicable to personal facts about an executive, which do not
adequately direct investors to the firm-value significance of an
executive's personal facts. Although much is not yet known about
the specific effects of these personal facts on firm value, investor
conduct, and the securities markets, certain relevant hypotheses
may be derived from recent scholarly work on investor and market
reactions to public disclosure.
1. Investors and the Market May Overreact to the Public
Disclosure of PersonalFacts About Executives
Although our existing securities regulation regime generally
presumes economically rational investor responses to publicly
available information, research indicates that investors do not
always behave in an economically rational manner.157 Investors may
155. See Redwood, supra note 103, at 404-09 (suggesting this kind of
approach). The Matthews court seems to suggest that a valid disclosure rule
effectuating this balance may be possible by noting that its decision might have
been different if the SEC had adopted a rule requiring disclosure. Matthews,
787 F.2d at 49 ("We hold that at least so long as uncharged criminal conduct is
not required to be disclosed by any rule lawfully promulgated by the SEC,

nondisclosure of such conduct cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution."
(emphasis added)).
156. See supra Part II.A.3.
157. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality:
The Case of the Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 59 (2006).
However, the line between investor rationality and irrationality may be hard to
draw, which presents distinct regulatory difficulties.
In a market in which prices can and do deviate from fundamental
value, in a market where investor sentiment plays an important role,
in a market that functions like the famous Keynes beauty contest, it is
hard to decide what information constitutes a rational basis for
trading. Investors may lose money when trading on the basis of
fundamentals, or make money by following the length of women's
skirts. The difficulty of identifying appropriate and inappropriate
bases for trading decisions suggests a challenge for regulators in
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overreact to uncertainty, for example, and sell based on any news
that they perceive to be unfavorable.15
This reaction may occur
even where the unfavorable news is unlikely to have any significant
effect on corporate assets, earnings, or operations. 59 The presence of
unsophisticated investors in the market may account for some of
this kind of trading activity.
Moreover, investors, like executives, are subject to psychological
biases that may dictate economically unexplainable or irrational
behavior. 160 Both unsophisticated and sophisticated investors may
61
overreact to the disclosure of personal facts about an executive.
The rapid dissemination of information to investors through the
Internet, and the ability of investors to engage in securities trading
over the Internet, may contribute to the operation or strength of
investor biases. 6 2 These biases may operate when investors are
confronted with disclosures of, or failures to disclose, personal facts
about executives.
For example, investors, like executives, may fall into a timedelay trap; they may make investment decisions based on shortterm, rather than long-term, corporate or market effects. 63 The
time-delay trap may cause investors to react to personal facts about
executives based on the perceived immediate effects of those facts on
attempting to reduce irrational investor behavior.
Id. at 73.
158. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and
Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for
Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 145 (1991) (noting that market volatility
may be explained by investors' "irrational judgments about uncertainty").
159. Cf Fisch, supra note 157, at 68 (observing that "investor irrationality
can cause prices to deviate from fundamental values").
160. Fisch, supra note 157, at 67.
161. Professor Susanna Ripken explains:
Sophisticated investors and professionals can suffer from the same
cognitive
and behavioral
biases that constrain individual,
unsophisticated investors.
Experts can become information
overloaded in ways that affect their decision-making processes. In
fact, under certain circumstances, experts can actually perform worse
than non-experts. Overconfidence and optimism biases can be even
more pronounced in professional investors than lay investors.
Sophisticated investors' past investment experience may lead them to
take greater risks in the belief that they are much better stock-pickers
than they really are. They may also be overconfident in their ability
to assess corporate executives' credibility and performance, and
reluctant to admit their own shortcomings in decision-making. Some
evidence shows that even professional security analysts and economic
forecasters overreact to information in the market.
Ripken, supra note 11, at 181-82 (footnotes omitted).
162. Fisch, supra note 157, at 68-69 (making this observation with respect
to the overconfidence bias).
163. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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the corporation and the market for its securities rather than the
long-term impacts of those facts on firm value. 6 4
Similarly,
investors may exhibit an anchoring bias,'65 leading them to make
and sustain investment decisions based on knee-jerk, initial
reactions to enticing, easily digested, information-even as a
moderated reaction or no reaction emerges as a more economically
rational response in the aftermath of disclosure 6
Personal facts
about executives typically are relatively easy to understand and may
engender immediate positive or negative responses from investors
that may not be easily offset by subsequent mediating facts.
Also, scholars have determined that investors may be
overconfident in their investment acumen, causing frequent trading
that inures to their financial detriment. 61 7 Overconfident investors
may place disproportionate reliance on public representations
relating to corporations; they engage in active trading because they
believe that they know and understand the effects of that
information on firm value-or at least stock price. 168 Accordingly,
investors who are overconfident may be more likely to trade on the
basis of publicly released personal facts about executives, even
where the disclosure of those facts does not and will not affect firm
value.
The overall market or the market for a specific company's
164. Professor Larry Cunningham notes that this type of trading may not, in
fact, be irrational under certain circumstances.
[IInvestor overreaction or inaction in the face of specific news (such as
improved earnings or a new product announcement) may not be
irrational because of different investor time horizons. Such behavior
also may not be irrational if broader macroeconomic, technical, or
structural factors dictate that optimism or caution should accompany
a particular bit of news.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
546, 603 (1994).
165. Fisch, supra note 157, at 67 (describing anchoring as "the tendency for
people to make decisions based on an initial estimate that is later adjusted, but
not sufficiently to eliminate the influence of the initial estimate").
166. Id. at 69 ("Studies show that investors are likely to respond more
heavily to salient information--'information that stands out and captures
attention."').
167. Id. at 67-69; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk:
Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 639 (1996) ("A fair body of
research suggests that people (perhaps especially those high in social and
economic status) exhibit a predictable overconfidence in their ability to control
future events and avoid risks. Investors probably overrate their stock-picking
abilities, leading to an underestimation of risk." (footnotes omitted)).
168. Cf Fisch, supra note 157, at 68 (making analogous points with respect
to investor reactions to analyst recommendations).
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securities may react to irrational investor behavior."' A market
reaction is not, of course, automatic. 7 0 However, if enough investors
trade irrationally in accordance with these or other biases, or if
investors not subject to these biases engage in herding behaviors
(where investors follow prevailing buy or sell trends), the market
will react in an economically irrational manner. 7 ' Accordingly, to
the extent that individual investors overreact to the public
disclosure of personal facts about an executive, a more broad-based
market overreaction may follow.
2. Public and Private Enforcement Is Encouraged in an
Environment Where Few Tangible Benefits Are Likely to Result
The investor and market behaviors summarized above, when
added to uncertainties as to the legal compulsion to disclose private
facts about executives under gap-filling and antifraud rules, are a
veritable recipe for investor dissatisfaction. Investor dissatisfaction
is likely to result in public or, more likely, private enforcement
under Rule 10b-5 for the inaccurate or incomplete disclosure of
material facts7 2 (in addition to increased selling, the so-called Wall

169. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action
as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 8 n.16 (2007) ("Some commentators
have.., suggested that the market overreacts to bad news.")..
170. Professor Marcel Kahan explains, using an example relevant to the
thesis of this Article:
Excess volatility in the price of individual stocks will not necessarily
result in excess market volatility.
Assume, for example, that
investors overreact only to company-specific information (e.g., the
state of health of the CEO). As a result, individual stock prices may
be excessively volatile, but stock markets in the aggregate would not
(because the "overreaction" element in the stock price is diversifiable).
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate"Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 995 n.81 (1992).
171. See Hazen, supra note 158, at 145 ("As volatility increases, the herd
instinct causes many investors to follow, which in turn magnifies price
movements. To the extent that investors overreact, the markets are focusing on
the short-term rather than long-term view. . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
172. Daniela Nanau, Note, Analyzing Post-Market Boom Jurisprudence in
the Second and Ninth Circuits: Has the Pendulum Really Swung Too Far in
Favor of Plaintiffs?, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLV & ETHics J. 943, 946 (2006)
("[Mlost of the corporate fraud that occurred during the late 1990s will come to
light solely through the class action lawsuits filed on behalf of aggrieved
investors."); Nanette L. Stasko, Comment, Competitive Bidding in the
Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1667, 1668
(1994) ("Less tolerant of a corporation's faulty predictions, investors no longer
wait for the tide to turn. Instead, they allege that a hopeful, but mistaken,
prediction about the way stock will perform is a false and misleading statement
of material fact in violation of federal securities law.").
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Street option, and investor activism). 173 Litigation under Rule 10b-5
has become the most significant way that a shareholder can
participate in corporate governance and constrain management
behavior.174 Liability uncertainties in this environment have tended
to favor class action plaintiffs. This is especially true in securities
class actions; most corporate and individual defendants in those
actions settle their cases out of court and pay significant damages to
plaintiff classes in doing so. 175

corporate
These damages exceed
N.J176

liabilities resulting from public enforcement efforts.

Both the

173. See Sharon Hannes, Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform
Proposal, 30 J. CORP. L. 51, 75 (2004) ("Traditionally, institutions expressed
dissatisfaction with firm management by taking the 'Wall Street Walk' and
selling their shares. However, with the increased concentration of equity in
institutional hands, this exit strategy became difficult to employ.
Consequently, institutions became long-term investors, a position that
heightened interest in their monitoring role." (footnotes omitted)).
174. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 878-86, 905-08
(2003).
175. See Elaine Buckberg et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2003 Update, 5 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 305 (2004), available at
(indicating that eighty
http://www.nera.com/image/200405BNATrends.pdf
percent of securities class actions settle); Todd Foster et al., Recent Trends in
ShareholderClass Action Litigation:Filings Plummet, Settlements Soar, NERA
Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?
CONSULTING,
ECON.
pID=3028 (noting that seven of the ten highest dollar-value settlements
occurred in 2005-06 and documenting increases in average and median
settlement amounts in 2006); see also Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson,
Securities Litigationand its Lawyers: Changes During the FirstDecade After the
PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2006) ("[Mlost securities class actions
settle."); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through
Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of
FinancialInstitutions To Participatein Securities Class Action Settlements, 58
STAN.L. REV. 411, 418 (2005) ("Settlements are the end game for securities class
action suits. Even though several hundred securities class actions are settled
annually, fewer than one or two securities class action suits are tried in any
year."); Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under
the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1107 n.23 (2007) ("Federal securities class
actions that are not dismissed almost always settle."); Jerod Neas, Note, Dura
Duress: The Supreme Court Mandates a More Rigorous Pleading and Proof
Requirement for Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 ClassActions, 78 U. COLO. L.
REV. 347, 372 (2007) ("[N]early every Rule 10b-5 claim that survives dismissal
will be settled.").
176. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1542 (2006)
("[Slecurities class action settlements averaged an annual aggregate amount...
exceeding the sum of all public monetary sanctions. To be sure, the federal
securities laws are also enforced by criminal penalties (chiefly, incarceration)
and by SEC suspensions, expulsions, cease and desist orders, and other
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number of Rule 10b-5 class actions brought each year and the
settlement amounts in those actions
may be impacted by irrational
177
investor and market behaviors.

Accordingly, enforcement against an executive or the
corporation under Rule 10b-5 is likely to be costly to the corporation
and the investing public.
Enforcement involves financial
expenditures and consumes human resources, siphoning these
financial and nonfinancial assets from the corporation and diverting
them from more important, value-enhancing operational uses.178
Market irrationality may enhance these costs. 79

When corporate

resources are squandered or redirected through litigation, certain
investors may benefit (as plaintiffs or plaintiff class members), while
others suffer (as nonplaintiff security holders).'80 Moreover, "it is an
open question as to whether the typical securities class action
settlement actually produces any net recovery, particularly to
diversified shareholders."
Enforcement
against
corporations
or executives
for
misstatements and omissions of personal facts may also have
negative effects on a corporation's or executive's willingness to
disclose an executive's personal facts. One scholar notes, in this
context, that
corporations and insiders may choose not to make
discretionary efficiency-enhancing disclosures rather than
nonmonetary relief. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' attorneys appear to extract more
funds from corporate pocketbooks than do all federal and state regulators.").
Interestingly, settlement values are apparently higher in securities class
actions for which there is a parallel SEC enforcement action. James D. Cox et
al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics:An EmpiricalInquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763-

66 (2003).
177. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 137, 146 (2006) ("[E]xpanding liability to account for irrationality may
increase litigation by reducing courts' ability to screen frivolous suits.").

178. In fact, the magnitude of current securities class action settlements has
the capacity to negatively impact the market for a corporation's securities or
send a corporation into financial ruin. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex
Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1763-64 (2005).
179. Ribstein, supra note 177, at 146 ("[Mlarket irrationality may force
defendants to pay more by holding them accountable for stock price fluctuations
that resulted from investor overreaction to the misrepresentations, or that

might not even have been connected with defendants' misrepresentations.").
180. See Coffee, supra note 176, at 1536-37 (describing the inequitable effect
of securities class actions, and noting generally that, "because the costs of
securities class actions-both the settlement payments and the litigation
expenses of both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation, its
shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often inequitably").
181.

Coffee, supra note 176, at 1547.
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risking draconian liability .

.

.

. Corporate insiders are

particularly vulnerable to litigation risk since, even if the
corporation or insurance pays the judgment, the insiders have
a non-diversifiable risk of reputation loss. The business
judgment rule in state corporate law is intended to minimize
but there is no such rule in federal
this risk of over-deterrence,
1 82
securities law.

Reputational and related individual effects on executives may
be more significant in actions brought on the basis of personal facts
than in actions brought on the basis of corporate facts, given that
the substance of the disclosure itself, as well as the alleged
disclosure lapse, is personal in nature. Still, because of insurance
and corporate indemnification, executives, unlike corporations,
rarely face actual out-of-pocket financial liability in securities class
actions. 83 Accordingly, the overall incentives for accurate and
complete disclosure by corporations and executives under the
antifraud rules are somewhat unclear, as are the benefits of
litigation on the basis of inaccurate or incomplete disclosures of an
executive's personal facts.
III. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE DUTIES WITH RESPECT TO EXECUTIVES'
PERSONAL FACTS SHOULD AND CAN BE BETTER CONSTRUCTED

With all of the foregoing in mind, Part III maps out a "better
way." Specifically, this Part suggests a disclosure scheme applicable
to executives' personal facts that:
(a) decreases discretion placed in the hands of executives
through meaningful, routinized corporate disclosures about the
organizational importance of specific executives;
(b) limits incursions of important individual rights through
tailored corporate disclosures prompted by specific events or
transactions;
(c) encourages more rational investor and market behaviors to
promote investor protection and market integrity by using
disclosure rules and guidance as investor education tools; and
182. Ribstein, supra note 177, at 146 (footnotes omitted); see also
Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 178, at 1764 (mentioning "both the corporate
and the individual defendants' prospect of sustaining reputational losses" and
other factors that increase the risk aversion of executives); Franco, supra note
14, at 269-71 (noting that the interests of management and the corporation in

making antifraud disclosure determinations may not be the same and that
withholding disclosure is a likely effect of broad antifraud disclosure
prescriptions); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities
Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 845-46 (1995) (making the point that
antifraud provisions deter voluntary disclosures, using management disclosures
as an example).
183. Coffee, supra note 176, at 1550-52.
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(d) minimizes corporate and individual costs associated with
any suggested regulatory changes.'84
The suggested disclosure system involves the implementation of
specialized, limited enhancements to existing mandatory disclosure
rules applicable to public companies in periodic and current
reporting contexts. These enhancements can be promulgated and
rule
adopted by the SEC through ordinary notice-and-comment
18 5
making as an addition to Subpart 400 of Regulation S-K.
The Proposal
Because uncertainty regarding the disclosure of executives'
personal facts places too much discretion in the hands of executives,
fails to adequately resolve tensions between securities disclosure
rules and individual rights, and promotes irrational investor
behavior, more certainty should obviate or minimize some of these
Accordingly, the proposed mandatory disclosure
concerns.
enhancements involve creating more certainty by layering new
current reporting obligations onto new baseline reporting
obligations. Each of the two proposed obligations is described below,
followed by a summary indicating how these obligations may meet
the four objectives identified at the outset of this Part.

A.

1.
Minimally Enhance Corporate Mandatory Disclosure
Requirements to Focus the Attention of Corporations,Executives,
Investors, and the Market
First, the SEC should establish baseline mandatory corporate
disclosures of executives' personal facts in the 1933 Act registration
statements and the 1934 Act periodic reports (Form 10-K or Form
10-Q). These mandatory disclosures would establish, at the outset
of public company status or an individual's service as an executive
and on a periodic basis during the executive's term of office, 186 the
corporate significance of the executive's service and other attributes
(e.g., name-as-the-brand or other elements of iconic status)importance to operations, financial condition or results of
operations, or other aspects of firm value. This baseline disclosure
184. The reader no doubt will recognize that the first three listed objectives
emanate directly from the deficiencies identified in Part II of this Article. The
fourth objective invokes cost assessment as an important (but often overlooked)
additional element applicable to proposals for regulatory change.
185. Management and Certain Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-.407
(2007).
186. These baseline disclosures would operate in much the same way that
Form 3 operates in establishing a starting point for disclosures to be made on
an ongoing basis on Forms 4 and 5 under Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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about each executive should address the fungibility of the
executive-how easy it would be to replace him or her in the thenapplicable market for executive services. The baseline disclosures
would have to be meaningful; they should focus specifically on the
attributes of each executive as they relate to the specific public
company for which the executive serves and should consist of more
than mere boilerplate or generalized statements (as are typical in
"Risk Factors" disclosures on executive importance in current 1933
Act prospectuses).81 7 Certain executives would merit specific and

detailed disclosures about ways in which their presence, availability,
integrity, or reputation may impact the corporation; others would
In any event,
warrant disclosure of a more limited nature.
disclosure about each executive would have to be considered and
resolved by management (including the board of directors) and
corporate counsel on an individual basis. The relevant baseline
disclosures would be updated annually in the corporation's Form 10K or sooner, if made necessary by intervening facts.188
187. See, e.g., Geovera Ins. Holdings, Ltd., Amendment No. 3 to
Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 15 (May 16, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393941/000119312507123021/dsla.htm.
This registration statement includes the somewhat standard disclosure set
forth below:
If we lose key personnel or are unable to recruit qualified personnel,
our ability to implement our business strategies could be delayed or
hindered.
Our success depends, in part, upon the efforts of certain of our
executive officers and other key personnel. We rely substantially
upon the services of Kevin Nish, our President and Chief Executive
Officer. Although we are not aware of any planned departure by Mr.
Nish, the loss of his services could prevent us from fully implementing
our business strategies and materially adversely affect our business,
financial condition and results of operations. We have an employment
agreement with Mr. Nish which provides for a term through
November 2010, but either we or Mr. Nish may terminate his
employment with us earlier. See "Executive compensation-Narrative
description of summary compensation and grants of plan-based
We
awards-Employment Agreements; termination benefits."
currently maintain a key man insurance policy that provides coverage
only for Mr. Nish.
As we continue to grow, we will need to recruit and retain qualified
management personnel, but we may not be able to do so. Our ability
to recruit and retain such personnel will depend upon a number of
factors, such as our results of operations, prospects and the level of
competition then prevailing in the market for qualified personnel.
Failure to recruit and retain such personnel could materially
adversely affect our business, financial condition and results of
operations.

Id.
188. These updates would be made in the same manner as updates to
corporate risk factors disclosed on a periodic basis in accordance with Item
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2. Provide Disclosure Guidance for Public Companies and
Their Executive Officers for Use in Managing and Making
CurrentDisclosuresof Executives' PersonalFacts
Next, the SEC should provide specific guidance on event-based
and transaction-triggered corporate disclosures of executives'
personal facts in current reports (on Form 8-K) under the 1934 Act.
These disclosures would be prompted only when a personal fact
impacts a specific executive's articulated importance to the
company, as identified in the corporation's baseline disclosures
about the executive (as the same are updated from time to time) and
could be simply implemented as an addition to the items required to
be reported on Form 8-K. 8 9 This corporate mandatory disclosure
requirement should make it easier for an executive to know when to
report a personal fact to the corporation's board because he or she
would be familiar with the baseline public disclosures about his or
her corporate importance and should be better able to assess the
potential significance of personal facts in light of those pre-existing
public disclosures.
3. Meet Objectives by Reducing Identified Deficiencies in the
Current Fraud-Based Disclosure Regime and Using Existing
DisclosureLaw Principlesand Practices
The proposed mandatory disclosure enhancements outlined in
this Part (collectively, the "Proposal") are designed to address the
three observed deficiencies in the existing scheme of disclosure
outlined in Part II of this Article and to do so at a low additional cost
to the corporation.
a. Reduce Executive Discretionin DisclosureDecision Making.
By providing for targeted mandatory disclosure about executives'
corporate importance and personal facts, the Proposal decreases in
503(c) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2007), through requirements
like those set forth in Item 1A of Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a, available at
(providing for updates to
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formlO-q.pdf
preexisting disclosures of corporate risk factors). These risk factors are
required to be disclosed in the 1933 Act registration statements and in annual
reports on Form 10-K. See, e.g., Form S-1, supra note 24, at Item 3; Form S-3,
supra note 24, at Item 3; Form 10-K, supra note 25, at Item 1A. Although the
obligation to disclose and update risk factors also covers the corporate
importance of an executive, the disclosure currently required is not sufficiently
detailed to reliably elicit targeted disclosures about the ways in which
executives, including those other than the chief executive officer, are important
to firm value.
189. See Form 8-K, at Item 5.02, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308, available at
http://www.sec.gov/aboutlforms/form8-k.pdf (regarding various managementoriented disclosures).
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several respects the amount of discretion in the hands of executives
faced with the possible public disclosure of personal facts. First, it
puts primary mandatory disclosure responsibility on the
corporation. This responsibility should create an incentive for the
corporation to establish policies and procedures to ensure
compliance with its new, targeted mandatory disclosure obligations
under the federal securities laws. As part of these policies and
procedures, the corporation would request information on personal
facts periodically from its executives (as it does to ensure compliance
with other mandatory disclosure rules). Accordingly, the Proposal
casts executives principally in the role of responders rather than
initiators in the disclosure of their personal facts. The corporation's
board is in the driver's seat of the disclosure bus.
The Proposal's mandatory disclosure rules also create a duty to
disclose, in certain contexts. Because isolating the source of a duty
to disclose can be difficult for executives under current antifraud
provisions,'90 the Proposal offers executives a clearer path and
narrows the scope of their decision making.
Executive discretion is further decreased under the Proposal
because the Proposal more narrowly focuses a corporation's and
executive's materiality analyses under applicable antifraud
disclosure provisions 9 ' by creating, through carefully crafted
baseline disclosures, presumptive elements of materiality (based on
the ways in which the executive is important to the corporation).'92
Well-considered and well-documented board decisions on the
190. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. Professors Donald
Langevoort and Mitu Gulati describe this difficulty accurately and succinctly:
[T]he question of whether and when there is a duty to disclose is often
the central question in any given case. Certainly, the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) has broad powers to compel disclosures
by issuers and certain others and has crafted a mandatory disclosure
regime that creates many explicit duties. For a variety of reasons,
however, this explicit regime falls short of a comprehensive answer to
the duty question. For some sixty years now, the hardest duty
questions have been addressed under the rubric of fraud, mainly
under Rule 10b-5, the principal antifraud provision of the securities
laws.
Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 53, at 1640.
191. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
192. The baseline disclosures in the Proposal would share certain attributes
with the meaningful cautionary statements required under the statutory safe
harbor provisions for forward-looking information enacted as part of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c),
78u-5(c) (2000). Under both the Proposal and the PSLRA safe harbor, ex ante
disclosures increase publicly available information and decrease potential
liability for securities fraud claims "based on an untrue statement of a material
fact or omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not
misleading." Id. §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5(c).
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importance of an executive to the corporation's business, financial
condition, and results of operations should be given deference by a
court and, therefore, should provide executives with a known and
reliable basis for their decision making about what and when to
disclose. Not all criminal investigations, terminal or other serious
illnesses, financial troubles, extramarital affairs, or other personal
facts would need to be disclosed by the executive to the corporation
or by the corporation to the public. Corporate disclosure only would
be required if personal facts would impact an area in which the
executive is important to the corporation.
b. Reduce Friction Between Federal Securities Disclosure
Rules and IndividualRights. Any compelled public disclosure by an
individual creates obvious tensions with the rights to privacy, free
speech, and avoidance of self-incrimination, since each of these
rights protects (on some level) the ability of an individual to remain
silent.
No proposal promoting disclosure can eliminate those
tensions.
However, the current disclosure of executives' personal facts is
based principally on whether those facts are material facts within
'
the meaning of applicable securities laws and rules. 93
Little salient
guidance is offered by the SEC or the courts on the application of
existing materiality standards in this context. Moreover, there is no
apparent emphasis, in gauging materiality or the overall need for
disclosure, on balancing the policies underlying federal securities
laws (investor protection and market integrity promotion) against
the policies underlying applicable individual rights (although an
occasional case or controversy may force a court's hand in this
regard).
The Proposal offers a more direct opportunity for the SEC to
engage in some of that policy balancing ex ante. SEC action in
adopting line-item corporate disclosure requirements would
mandate more tailored disclosures in a specific disclosure
environment (as opposed to calling for open-ended disclosures of
material fact when a duty to disclose is deemed to exist). This
reliance on explicit, targeted periodic and current reporting focuses
the scope of potential disclosures and, therefore, creates less
potential for conflict between securities regulation and individual
rights. Specific mandatory disclosures of personal facts should be
limited to those that best serve applicable policy objectives
underlying both securities regulation and individual rights.
Moreover, the actual text of the disclosure requirements drafted
in accordance with the Proposal can be constructed with sensitivity

193.

See supra Part I.A.3.
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to the competing interests posed by the federal securities laws and
applicable individual rights. While this Article leaves the drafting
of that text for a later day, one can imagine, for example, the
incorporation of concepts from Fifth Amendment jurisprudence on
self-incrimination in the rules regarding event-based and
transaction-triggered disclosures (or the related instructions). In
addition, the SEC may determine, either internally or through the
notice-and-comment process necessary to its rule making, that there
are specific personal facts relating to executives that may remain
private because the policies underlying the related individual rights
always supervene those underlying the securities laws.
Finally, the codification of disclosure rules relating to
executives' private facts in accordance with the Proposal affords
executives a clearer expectation of the extent to which they can
exercise their rights to privacy, free speech, and avoidance of selfincrimination while serving as public company executive officers.
Although executives do have to accede to a curtailment of their
individual rights in taking on service with a public company,
adoption of the Proposal will put them on notice as to the extent of
that curtailment ex ante and enable them to better weigh the
benefits and detriments of that service. This transparency also
should help prosecutors avoid claims that nondisclosing executives
were denied due process when faced with criminal securities
charges.194
c. Encourage More Rational Investor and Market Behaviors.
The Proposal also is designed to promote investor protection and
market integrity by embedding relevant market information in the
market price for publicly traded securities and by using disclosure
rules and guidance as investor education tools. The baseline
corporate disclosures of executives' corporate importance should
prime the market for future disclosures of executives' personal facts.
Logically, the market would then discount the value of the
corporation's publicly traded securities to account for the potential
disclosure of relevant personal facts relating to the corporation's
executives.
The discount rate would vary from corporation to
corporation. Assuming accurate baseline disclosures, the more
rational the investor base is, the more accurate the discount should
be.
Also, by codifying the bases for public disclosure of executives'
personal facts, the Proposal should sensitize investors to these bases
and enable them to be better informed about the need for and
relevance of corporate and individual disclosures of executives'
194. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
this claim with favor in an analysis under the existing disclosure regime).
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personal facts.
In essence, the Proposal should better equip
investors to know what is important about particular executives'
personal facts even before any facts may be disclosed and would be
able to promptly react to actual disclosures of personal facts on a
more economically rational basis. In short, the rules comprising the
Proposal may be deemed a form of investor education. 9 '
Finally, because the Proposal should better inform investors
and encourage more rational investor and market behaviors,
corporations and executives should have less fear about liability
emanating from irrational investor or market behavior. When
combined with the additional clarity provided by the mandatory
disclosure rules comprising the Proposal, this decreased
apprehension should enable corporations and executives to make
better, more objective disclosure decisions.
d. Minimize Costs Associated with Legal Change. The
mandatory disclosure enhancements embodying the Proposal are
not without cost. However, the costs of this legal change 196 can be
minimized by using existing disclosure regulation principles and
practices to effectuate compliance with the new regime. 197 Learning
costs, 9 ' for example, would be minimal, since the proposed line-item
rules would not be complex or lengthy and represent only a modest
enhancement of existing disclosure requirements applicable to
public companies.
Public companies, executives, counsel, judges,
law professors, and practitioners all should find the proposed rule
changes relatively easy to understand and digest.
Uncertainty costs 20 0 associated with the proposed disclosure

enhancements also should be quite low. In principal part, this is
because the enhancements are designed to work within the existing
195. See Fisch, supra note 157, at 74. However, investor education may not
be able to correct for investor behavioral biases. Id. at 74-75.
196. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49
UCLA L. REV. 789, 793 (2002) (noting that legal change, itself, generates costs:
"Whatever one's normative perspective, a legal system will incur costs simply in
adjusting to the existence of a new legal norm.").
197. Cf. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 129, 199-200 (2005) (suggesting the use of existing structures of securities
law in the context of corporate information security).
198. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 196, at 816-22 (describing and
explaining learning costs).
199. See id. at 819 ("The extent of... learning costs ... is likely to increase
in direct relation to the ambition, novelty, and complexity of the reform project.
An incrementally new common law rule, for example, likely will impose lower
learning costs than a comprehensive legislative product." (footnote omitted)).
200. See generally id. at 822-35 (describing and explaining negative and
positive uncertainty costs).
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securities disclosure system to clarify and hone vague, amorphous
disclosure requirements already in existence under current
antifraud rules. Legal precedent and interpretive value under
existing law would be used, rather than abandoned, in constructing
and interpreting the new disclosure rules. Moreover, although there
is always uncertainty with new rules, there are unlikely to be many
new planning, legal counsel, or litigation costs associated with
uncertainties created by the new disclosure rules proposed here.
Costs associated with compliance planning, legal advice, and
litigation borne of uncertainty under the proposed mandatory
disclosure regime logically should be lower than those associated
with the existing fraud-based disclosure regime, since the Proposal
is designed to cure ambiguities in the existing regime. 0 1 The rule
changes comprising the Proposal should enhance, rather than
detract from, legal stability.
Precision in drafting the text of the new disclosure rules
included in the Proposal should help avoid significant opportunity
costs.

22

The legal change brought about by the Proposal is designed

to increase, rather than decrease, guidance on existing law and
should act to encourage, rather than discourage, desirable
disclosures in more circumstances than existing law. 0 3 In fact, if
drafted precisely, the mandatory disclosure rules comprising the
Proposal should decrease uncertainty and make corporations and
executives less risk averse in disclosure decision making.0 4
Adoption of the Proposal would create certain (but ostensibly
201. The corporation should not have to engage accountants or financial
advisors to assist it in addressing legal and operational uncertainties resulting
from the Proposal. And while both the executives and the board of directors
will spend time analyzing the corporate importance and personal facts of
executives and crafting related disclosures, this time will not be as extensive as
would be required for compliance with most of the requirements of SarbanesOxley and would represent an incremental addition to the corporation's overall
disclosure burden.
202. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 196, at 835-36 (describing and
explaining uncertainty and opportunity costs).
203. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing, among other
things, the deterrence of desirable disclosures under the current regime).
204. Professor Van Alstine acknowledges this possibility:
Many existing bodies of law, for instance, are themselves highly
uncertain or otherwise substantively defective. Moreover, the existing
legal costs of a socially desirable activity may be the problem a new
body of law is designed to redress. The adoption of new legal norms
thus may serve, among other things, to clarify contentious legal
problems, simplify excessive complexity, facilitate new and valuable
forms of human interaction, and otherwise advance the interests of
legal certainty.
Van Alstine, supra note 196, at 857.
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Private drafting costs would

increase because existing corporate disclosures in SEC filings and
D&O Questionnaires, compliance policies and memoranda, and
other documents involved in corporate and executive legal
compliance will need to be supplemented to include information
required to be supplied in accordance with the Proposal. However,
most (if not all) existing periodic disclosures should remain the
same, so these drafting costs will not be significant.
Private administrative costs also would be incurred by
corporations and executives as a result of adoption of the Proposal.
Specifically, existing compliance structures would need to be altered
to reflect the additional requirements of new mandatory disclosure
rules. However, these costs should be nominal, since internal
compliance and risk-reduction mechanisms resulting from the
Proposal can easily be implemented by corporations as part of their
existing internal disclosure compliance processes for periodic and
current reporting. 206 Corporations and executives need not reinvent
the veritable compliance wheel in order to comply with the new
rules suggested in the Proposal.
Because adoption of the Proposal would principally affect
internal governance only (the relationship among corporations,
executives, and investors), the rule changes embodied in the
Proposal should have little impact on accrued private networks.
Said another way, the corporation's standard contractual and
business relations with third parties should not be affected by
adoption of the Proposal.
Error costs 2°7 resulting from adoption of the Proposal should be

small. Even without precise text on which to reflect, the likelihood
that there would be "imperfections in the articulation, or
inaccuracies in application," 8 of the mandatory disclosure rules
comprising the Proposal is minimal. These rules operate in narrow
subject matter areas-executives' importance to the corporation and
executives' private facts-making it easier to draft the rules
205. See generally id. at 836-45 (describing and explaining private
adjustment costs).
206. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, the
mandatory disclosure enhancements proposed in this Article do not overburden
the corporation and its executives with compliance costs. For a description of
some of the disclosure-related burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley on corporations and
their executives, see Jeannie Nelson, Comment, New Corporate Responsibility
Law Increases Liabilities for Directors, Officers, and Attorneys, But Does It
Increase Protectionsfor Investors?,34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1165, 1189-93 (2003).
207. See generally Van Alstine, supra note 196, at 845-50 (describing and
explaining error costs).
208. Id. at 845.

2007]

DISCLOSURE OFEXECUTIVES' PERSONAL FACTS 799

precisely. Moreover, the new rules are likely to be easier to apply
than existing antifraud rules because of their relative specificity.
Still, applicable rule makers at the SEC should endeavor to avoid
"formulation errors of unintended vagueness or ambiguity,
incompleteness,
overbreadth,
and
(more
destructive)
inconsistency, '' 20 9 and should ensure that their intent is well
understood by illuminating the rule text with helpful instructions
(like those that exist for other line-item disclosure rules under
Regulation S-K21 ° ) and by carefully crafting the promulgating and
adoption releases relating to the new rules.211
Finally, public transition costs 212 associated with adoption of the

Proposal also are nominal. The changes made by the Proposal are
limited in scope and consistent with existing law and regulation.
Accordingly, dispute resolution costs are not likely to increase
significantly, if at all. In fact, the hope is that by narrowing the
possible range of disclosures of executives' private facts, dispute
resolution costs would decrease. Of course, the SEC will have to
adjust its rules, forms, and internal compliance procedures (just like
the companies it regulates). But, as earlier noted with respect to
those corporate compliance costs, the limited nature of the proposed
rule changes minimizes the nature and amount of these outlays.
B.

ComparativeInstitutionalChoice
Having addressed the substance of the Proposal and its
perceived benefits as an improvement over the existing antifraudbased regime applicable to the public disclosure of executives'
personal facts, it is important to briefly discuss the rationale for
implementing the Proposal through SEC rule making as • opposed
to
•
213
congressional

legislation

or

federal

court

adjudications.

comparative analysis of four factors is relevant to the identificationA
209. Id. at 846 (footnotes omitted).
210. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
211. See Van Alstine, supra note 197, at 858 ("[L]awmakers have at their
disposal a variety of means to mitigate transitional friction, even for large-scale
or complex legal reforms.").
212. See generally id. at 850-52 (describing and explaining public transition
costs).
213. This Article assumes a federal approach because the immediate
problem to be resolved is created by failures in the federal disclosure rules. It
should be noted, however, that state corporate law may play a role in executive
disclosures of personal facts. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42(b) (2003)
(establishing state law disclosure/informational duties of corporate officers,
including the obligation of an officer to inform a superior officer or the board or
a board committee of material information about the affairs of the corporation);
id. §§ 8.60(4), 8.62, 8.63 (required disclosure of conflicting interests); id. § 8.70
(disclosure relating to corporate opportunities).
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of the appropriate rule-making body: (1) institutional power,
authority, or jurisdiction; (2) relative structural and substantive
competence; (3) influence and the potential for resulting bias; and
(4) relative transition costs. 21 4 Although a full analysis will not be
undertaken here, it is easy to see that a balancing of these four
factors favors SEC rule making.
First, the adoption of public company disclosure rules applicable
to the revelation of an executive's personal facts is within the
institutional power of Congress, 21 the authority of the SEC,21 6 and
the jurisdiction of the federal courts." 7 Accordingly, any of these
three federal rule makers is eligible to act on the Proposal.
Second, although the federal courts have done the heavy lifting
to date by making most of the rules governing disclosure under Rule
10b-5 and other antifraud rules (and, therefore, have developed
some expertise in the area), case-by-case adjudications of varied
plaintiffs' claims in multiple federal districts and circuits over time
have not provided, and cannot easily provide, the same
comprehensive resolution of issues concerning public disclosures of
executives' personal facts as congressional or SEC rule making can.
The changes in disclosure law that would be made by adoption of the
Proposal are seemingly politically uncontroversial and limited in
scope to disclosures about executives that have long been within the
expertise of the SEC. The deliberative, representative, accessible
nature of a Congress with relatively little expertise is therefore not
necessary to achieve adoption of the Proposal and, in fact, could
represent an impediment to the adoption of the Proposal.2 8

214. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right
Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. &

FIN. L. 225, 233-34 (2005).
215. Congress has the power to engage in securities rule making as part of
its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3.
216. The SEC has authority to engage in securities rule making as part of its
congressionally ordained role under the 1934 Act as the promulgator and
adopter of line-item and other disclosure rules, including the various forms used
in securities registration, periodic and current reporting, and event-based or
transaction-triggered disclosures. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77fAa), 78m(a), 78m(d),
78n(d) (2000); Heminway, supra note 214, at 257 n.96. The SEC was
established in Section 4 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
217. Among other things, the federal courts have jurisdiction over claims
brought under the federal securities laws, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa,
including Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
218. For example, a bill to implement the Proposal may get bogged down in
unnecessary debates over language that can more easily and expertly be
resolved at the SEC, which has greater expertise in this area.
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Third, a comparative assessment of institutional impartiality
depends upon a comparative assessment of each institution's
capacity for influence on a particular matter. The rules governing
public disclosure of executives' private facts are not currently a
political flashpoint or even an apparent concern of any particular
interest group. 2' 9 Any political party allegiances favoring or
opposing the Proposal may depend on the facts of specific cases.
This means that the capacity for influence and resulting bias should
not weigh heavily as a factor in the comparative institutional
analysis.
However, the potential for influence does exist. This potential
makes Congress a less desirable rule-making body since it is most
susceptible to public influence. Moreover, the more pure political
independence of the federal courts seems to be unnecessary, even if
desirable. Accordingly, while the SEC is potentially subject to some
influence (notably from public companies and their executives), that
capacity for influence is more limited than that of Congressespecially given the limited points of public access to the SEC.
Therefore, an analysis of impartiality weakly favors the SEC as the
appropriate rule-making body.
Fourth, the overall costs of legal change 220 should be less for
SEC rule making than for congressional or judicial rule making,
since the existing disclosure framework is "owned" and maintained
by the SEC. This means, among other things, that the SEC should
be the rule-making body capable of drafting "the most clear,
complete, comprehensive statement of the rule"22' and integrating it
seamlessly into the existing mandatory disclosure scheme. As a
result, learning, uncertainty, opportunity, error, and public
transition costs all should be lower with proficient SEC rule
making.222 Private adjustment costs associated with adoption and
implementation of the Proposal should be the same for each rulemaking body, assuming full implementation of the Proposal.
C.

Possible CollateralBenefit
Before concluding, it should be noted that the Proposal may

219. Although one could imagine political activity involving representatives
of one or more of the following potential interest groups: public companies,
executives, those favoring individual rights, or those favoring market-based,
rather than regulatory, disclosure solutions.
220. See supra notes 196-212 and accompanying text (identifying the
various operative costs of legal change associated with the Proposal).
221. Heminway, supra note 214, at 367.
222. See Van Alstine, supra note 196, at 859 (noting that "increased care
in ...articulation can prospectively mitigate much of the learning, uncertainty,
and kindred costs of new legal norms").
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have a benefit to corporations and investors unrelated to disclosure
regulation. By forcing public company boards of directors to more
closely and routinely analyze executive importance and,
presumably, be exposed more directly to executives' personal facts
(even when they do not end up being publicly disclosed), the
Proposal may encourage more and better planning for management
succession. If management succession planning were, in fact,
encouraged, it would become more a part of the culture of public
companies, and executive searches then should be more efficient
and, one would hope, more effective.
IV. CONCLUSION
A corporation or executive faced with the decision about
whether to disclose information relating solely or principally to an
executive's private (i.e., noncorporate) life will have a difficult time
making that decision under current law. In most cases, the
corporation or executive will have to determine, under applicable
antifraud laws and rules, whether there is a duty to disclose and, if
so, whether the executive's personal information is material such
that it must be disclosed. These are difficult legal determinations to
make, even for those not directly involved with the personal facts at
issue. However, the determinations are made more difficult by the
fact that the executive is involved with those personal facts and may
desire to keep them private, a feeling compounded by a perception
that investors may tend to overreact to public disclosure of those
facts, potentially causing unwarranted disruptions in the market for
the public company's securities or securities fraud actions against
the corporation, the executive, or both.
These difficulties can and should be resolved, however, by the
adoption of two relatively straightforward mandatory disclosure
rules by the SEC as part of its integrated disclosure system-one
rule calling for detailed, tailored, updatable baseline disclosures
regarding each executive's importance to the corporation, and one
that provides for focused event-based and transaction-triggered
disclosure of executives' personal facts. The new rules embodied in
the Proposal are designed to protect investors and promote market
integrity by correcting identified deficiencies in the existing
disclosure scheme-and to do so at a relatively low cost. Moreover,
the rules should encourage succession planning at public companies.
Accordingly, the SEC should adopt the Proposal to benefit
corporations, executives, investors, and others saddled with the
burdens of making, advising on, and interpreting disclosure
decisions regarding executives' personal facts.

